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INTRODUCTION
On November 2, 2010, over a quarter million Alaskans cast their ballots for
various offices, including United States Senator.1 The hotly contested election
involved incumbent Lisa Murkowski, who had lost the Republican primary but was
running a vigorous write-in campaign, Republican and Tea Party favorite Joe
Miller, and Democrat Scott McAdams.2 An initial count of the votes demonstrated
that approximately 40% of voters had written in a candidate, over 35% had voted

† Copyright © Joshua A. Douglas 2013.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. This Article
was named a winner of the 2011–2012 SEALS Call for Papers. The Article benefitted
greatly from comments I received at the Fourth Annual Junior Faculty Federal Courts
Workshop and the Southeastern Association of Law Schools (SEALS) New Scholars
Workshop. Special thanks to Ned Foley, Rick Hasen, Justin Levitt, Michael Kang, Mike
Pitts, Lori Ringhand, and Michael Solimine for providing invaluable insights on prior
drafts. Thanks also to Beau Steenken for extremely helpful library assistance and to Colin
Bruckel, Matt Hassen, and Kyle Hermanson for excellent research assistance. Finally,
thanks to the editors and staff of the Indiana Law Journal for helping to polish this Article.
1. ALASKA DIVISION OF ELECTIONS, STATE OF ALASKA 2010 GENERAL ELECTION:
NOVEMBER 2, 2010 OFFICIAL RESULTS (2010), available at http://www.elections.alaska.gov/
results/10GENR/data/results.htm.
2. See Sean Cockerham & Erika Bolstad, Murkowski Says “Let’s Make History,”
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Sept. 18, 2010), http://www.adn.com/2010/09/17/1459578/
murkowski-expected-to-say-yes.html.
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for Miller, and over 23% had voted for McAdams.3 If, as was expected, most of the
write-in votes went to Murkowski, then she would retain her Senate seat.4
Although it became clear fairly soon after Election Day that Murkowski had
received many more votes than Miller, Miller still refused to concede the election.5
Instead, he turned to the courts6—a destination for many close elections.7 Miller
argued that a large number of the write-in votes for Murkowski were invalid,
particularly if the voters had misspelled her name.8 Miller finally conceded almost
two months after Election Day, after he lost before both the Alaska Supreme Court
and the federal district court.9
Alaska, like all other states,10 has a specific, adjudicative procedure for election
contests, or post-election disputes about the true winner of the election. Under
Alaska’s election contest provision, a losing candidate may bring a lawsuit
challenging the election results in the superior court within ten days after the
completion of the state’s review of the election and may appeal the decision to the
state supreme court.11 Other states have even more detailed provisions. For
example, Norm Coleman, the losing candidate in the 2008 U.S. Senate election in
Minnesota, had to follow a statutorily-prescribed process in bringing a lawsuit to
contest the election of Al Franken.12 Minnesota’s election contest provisions place
a strict time limit on the filing of an election contest and the location of filing.13
The case is heard before a special court of three judges assigned by the chief justice
of the Minnesota Supreme Court.14 The three-judge court’s decision is appealable
directly to the supreme court (thus skipping the intermediate court of appeals level),
and the appeal must take precedence over all other matters before the state supreme
court.15

3. ALASKA DIVISION OF ELECTIONS, supra note 1.
4. See Sandhya Somashekhar, In Alaska, the Final Countdown, WASH. POST, Nov. 10,
2010, at A01.
5. Sandhya Somashekhar, Despite Alaska Senate Race Results, Joe Miller Presses on
in Principle, WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/11/27/AR2010112702896.html.
6. Miller v. Treadwell, 245 P.3d 867 (Alaska 2010).
7. See infra Part I.
8. Miller, 245 P.3d at 869.
9. Becky Bohrer, Miller Ending Legal Battle, Conceding Senate Race, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Jan. 1, 2011), https://advance.lexis.com/GoToContentView?requestid=1f93f35b-8220-46fdbbd6-84646d2e72af; see Miller v. Treadwell, 736 F. Supp. 2d 1240 (D. Alaska 2010) (raising
federal constitutional issues); Miller, 245 P.3d at 867.
10. See infra Part I.
11. ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.20.540, .550 (2010).
12. See Sheehan v. Franken, 767 N.W.2d 453, 456 (Minn. 2009) (per curiam). For a
detailed discussion of the Coleman-Franken dispute, see Edward B. Foley, The Lake
Wobegone Recount: Minnesota’s Disputed 2008 U.S. Senate Election, 10 ELECTION L.J. 129
(2011) [hereinafter Foley, Lake Wobegone Recount].
13. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 209.021 (West 2009) (providing that a contester must file an
election contest within seven days of a general election with the court administrator of the
District Court in Ramsey County).
14. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 209.045 (West 2009).
15. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 209.10(4) (West 2009) (providing that “[t]he appeal from an
election contest relating to the office of state senator or representative takes precedence over
all other matters before the Supreme Court”).
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State legislatures recognize that cases involving election contests are different
from normal legal disputes. A decision maker must determine the winner of an
election; in other words, a court or other tribunal will decide who will enact laws
under which the state’s residents are governed. Election contest cases therefore play
a fundamental role in shaping our democracy. As a result, state legislatures have
acknowledged the uniqueness of post-election disputes by enacting specific
provisions for election contests.16
This Article uncovers the different mechanisms states use to resolve election
contests. One universal rule regarding post-election disputes is that “[t]here is no
common law basis for election challenges.”17 As the Iowa Supreme Court
explained, “[t]he right to contest an election is only conferred by statute, and
contestants must strictly comply with the provisions of the statute in order to confer
jurisdiction. Thus, contestants are limited to the scheme provided by the
legislature.”18 An inquiry into election contests therefore entails a survey of state
election statutes and constitutions.19 Although it is possible that parties may file in
federal court and raise federal constitutional issues to challenge an election,
election contests are typically the province of state law.20 This Article provides the
first comprehensive analysis of existing state election codes regarding the
procedures for election contests.
In analyzing election contest procedures among the fifty states, the main trend
that emerges is a lack of uniformity in how states decide disputed elections. Some
states have multi-tiered processes involving many judges, while others leave the
decision up to a single body without possibility of appeal. Some states seem to
value quick decision making through their statutes, while others elevate the virtues
of robust review or the prevention of ideological bias. Understanding the myriad
processes currently on the books is vital to evaluating current procedures for

16. Election contest procedures are not unique to the United States. For example, the English
High Court of Justice (Queen’s Bench Division) recently voided the election results for a member
of parliament after the losing candidate brought an election contest, alleging that the winning
candidate had “published several false statements of fact in relation to the [losing candidate’s]
personal character or conduct which he had no reasonable grounds for believing to be true and did
not believe to be true.” See Watkins v. Woolas, [2010] EWHC (Q.B.) 2702, [3] (Eng.), available
at http://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/markup.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2010/2702.html.
17. BARRY H. WEINBERG, THE RESOLUTION OF ELECTION DISPUTES: LEGAL PRINCIPLES
THAT CONTROL ELECTION CHALLENGES 1 (2d ed. 2008); see also Steve Bickerstaff, Counts,
Recounts, and Election Contests: Lessons From the Florida Presidential Election, 29 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 425, 431 (2001).
18. Taylor v. Cent. City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 733 N.W.2d 655, 657 (Iowa 2007) (citation
omitted); see also Taylor v. Roche, 248 S.E.2d 580, 582 (S.C. 1978) (“The right to contest
an election exists only under the constitutional and statutory provisions, and the procedure
proscribed by statute must be strictly followed.”).
19. The appendix summarizes the various procedures for election contests by state and
type of election.
20. See Hugh M. Lee, An Analysis of State and Federal Remedies for Election Fraud,
Learning From Florida’s Presidential Election Debacle, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 159, 192 (2001)
(“Arguably, Congress has not adopted laws addressing persistent flaws in the election
process because such election contests have always been a matter of state law.”). Professor
Lee advocates for the broader use of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act or 42 U.S.C. § 1983
to fill the gap of state laws that have deficient election contest provisions. See id. at 192–214.
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resolving post-election disputes and deciding what aspects of the provisions are
most in need of reform.
The analysis of current election contest mechanisms leads to two conclusions for
moving forward. First, every state should, at a minimum, ensure that their methods
for resolving election contests are tied to defined goals, such as minimizing
ideological decision making, fostering timely resolution, and promoting clarity in
the resolution process. Second, and most lacking under the current regimes, states
should make certain that they appoint a neutral, unbiased decision maker to resolve
all election contests. This Article provides several models and discusses the key
considerations states should contemplate in creating an impartial election contest
tribunal.
A quick word on terminology is important before embarking on this discussion.
An “election contest” occurs once the election goes past the regular administrative
procedures of counting the votes and conducting a recount.21 That is, an election
contest is remedial in nature, in which a losing candidate seeks to have the certified
result overturned because of an election irregularity.22 The various provisions for
automatic or requested recounts are beyond the scope of this Article.23 I am instead
focusing on what happens when an election moves past the recount stage and goes
to an adjudicatory election contest procedure. Additionally, although parties may
raise federal constitutional issues such as equal protection or due process should
they exist in a post-election lawsuit—and might do so in federal court either
simultaneously or sequentially with a state case24—the focus of this Article is on
the state-created statutory mechanisms for resolving election contests.
Part I describes, for various types of elections, the procedures states have
enacted to resolve election contests. This Part analyzes state election contest
provisions for state representatives, governor and lieutenant governor, judges (for
those states that have elected judiciaries), members of Congress, and presidential
electors. Part II reveals the various trends that emerge from the different ways
states handle election contests, focusing on statutory deadlines, specific procedural
details, and the appeals process. Part III begins the discussion of what factors
should inform state election contest procedures. This Part calls on states to evaluate
their election contest provisions, with a specific focus on timing concerns and the
elimination of ideology or partisanship in the decision maker. In particular, this
Part offers one possible mechanism to minimize ideological decision making: the
creation of a five-member election contest tribunal with two “partisans” and three
“neutrals,” as well as a diversity of expertise among the panel members. Further, by
examining several factors that can help to eliminate, or at least balance, bias in who

21. See Steven F. Huefner, Remedying Election Wrongs, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 265,
278–79 (2007) (explaining the difference between a recount and an election contest).
22. See id. at 278–79.
23. For a summary of each state’s recount process, see Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless
Chase: Electronic Voting and Democratic Values, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1711, 1817–36
(2005).
24. See, e.g., Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219, 228 (6th Cir.
2011) (analyzing federal equal protection issues even though the parties also were litigating
in the Supreme Court of Ohio).
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decides an election contest, this Part provides a starting point for a discussion of
best practices states should consider in reformulating their election contest statutes.
I. ELECTION CONTESTS BY TYPE OF ELECTION
One mechanism for decoding the myriad state election contest statutes is to
group them by type of election. Indeed, many state contest provisions depend on
the specific office involved. This Part will describe the most common election
contest procedures for state legislative offices, governor and lieutenant governor,
judicial positions, congressional offices, and presidential electors. Although not
covering every possible election (such as referenda, municipal elections, or
primaries),25 this Part will describe election contest procedures for the most salient
and highly visible elections and the ones that are likely to impact the most people.
Public interest in election contests for these offices is likely to be substantial,
making it important to understand the procedures by which tribunals decide these
disputes. What emerges is a multitude of different processes and procedures, with
surprisingly little consistency among the states. Breaking down the categories by
type of election contest, however, demonstrates various trends in how states handle
post-election challenges. States can use this data to rethink their own approaches to
disputed elections.26
A. Election Contests Involving State Legislative Offices
By far, the most common mechanism states use for resolving contests for state
house and senate seats is to leave the matter to each respective house in the
legislature. Indeed, virtually all state constitutions, much like the U.S. Constitution,
provide that each house shall be the “judge of” its members’ “qualifications,
elections and returns.”27 Allowing each house to judge the elections of its members

25. Many states do not separate election contest provisions for municipal offices or
primaries from the general election contest statute. The states that mention these elections
typically follow the same general procedure as for other offices. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 1716-56 (LexisNexis 2007) (providing that the circuit court hears election contests for
municipal offices); ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-801 (2011) (same); CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 16100,
16101 (West 2003 & Supp. 2012) (stipulating rules for contesting primary elections, which
are roughly the same as for general election contests). The extent of any differences for these
lower-profile elections is beyond the scope of this Article.
26. In many ways, this compilation is a follow-up to a 1978 report by the National
Clearinghouse on Election Administration, Federal Election Commission. See INST. FOR
RESEARCH IN PUB. SAFETY, SCH. OF PUB. & ENVTL. AFFAIRS, IND. UNIV., AN ANALYSIS OF
LAWS AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING CONTESTED ELECTIONS AND RECOUNTS: FINAL REPORT,
VOL. II: THE STATE PERSPECTIVE (1978). That publication, while outdated, presents a general
synopsis of both the recount and contest procedures in all fifty states. This Article, while
obviously providing an updated account, also goes further, synthesizing the various election
contest regimes to identify the main trends among the states. It also offers a unique
perspective on the kind of tribunal that is best suited to resolve election contests. See infra
Part III.
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1; ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 51; ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 12;
ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 8; ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 11; CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 5; COLO.
CONST. art. V, § 10; CONN. CONST. art. III, § 7; DEL. CONST. art. II, § 8; FLA. CONST. art. III,
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is one aspect of legislative sovereignty.28 Accordingly, all but two states allow only
its own members ultimately to resolve a contested election to that body.29
Several states, however, still invoke judicial processes in deciding legislative
election contests even when giving the respective body of the legislature the final
say.30 For instance, Kansas statutes specifically require courts to play a role in the
§ 2; GA. CONST. art. III, § 4, para. 7; HAW. CONST. art. III, § 12; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 9;
ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 6; IND. CONST. art. IV, § 10; IOWA CONST. art. III, § 7; KAN. CONST.
art. II, § 8; KY. CONST. § 38; LA. CONST. art. III, § 7; ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 3; MD.
CONST. art. III, § 19; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 1, §§ II, art. IV, III, art. X; MICH. CONST. art.
IV, § 16; MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 6; MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 38; MO. CONST. art. III, § 18;
MONT. CONST. art. V, § 10; NEB. CONST. art. III, § 10; NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 6; N.H. CONST.
pt. II, arts. 22, 35; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 4, para. 2; N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 7; N.Y. CONST.
art. III, § 9; N.C. CONST. art. II, § 20; OHIO CONST. art. II, § 6; OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 30;
OR. CONST. art. IV, § 11; PA. CONST. art. II, § 9; R.I. CONST. art. VI, § 6; S.C. CONST. art. III,
§ 11; S.D. CONST. art. III, § 9; TENN. CONST. art. II, § 11; TEX. CONST. art. III, § 8; UTAH
CONST. art. VI, § 10; VT. CONST. ch. II, §§ 14, 19; VA. CONST. art. IV, § 7; WASH. CONST.
art. II, § 8; W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 24; WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 7; WYO. CONST. art. III, § 10.
28. See, e.g., Ronald A. Parsons, Jr., Pierre Pressure: Legislative Elections, the State
Constitution, and the Supreme Court of South Dakota, 50 S.D. L. REV. 218, 242 (2005)
(describing the legislature’s authority over election contests for legislative seats as “a
sovereign power that may not be constitutionally delegated to or shared with the courts”).
Paul Salamanca and James Keller offer three historical and theoretical reasons why most
states give legislatures the authority to judge the elections of their own members: the
conceptual relationship between legislative independence and legislative privilege, the
connection between control of a legislature’s membership and its independence among the
branches of government, and tradition in allowing legislatures to seat members whom the
voters choose even if the members do not meet the precise qualifications for service. See
Paul E. Salamanca & James E. Keller, The Legislative Privilege to Judge the Qualifications,
Elections, and Returns of Members, 95 KY. L.J. 241, 255 (2006–07).
29. North Dakota and Hawaii are the lone exceptions. North Dakota’s Constitution
provides, “[e]ach house is the judge of the qualifications of its members, but election
contests are subject to judicial review as provided by law.” N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 12. In
1987, the North Dakota Supreme Court ruled that then-current North Dakota law manifested
the legislature’s intent that, notwithstanding the Constitutional provision, only the legislature
could hear legislative-election contests. Timm v. Schoenwald, 400 N.W.2d 260, 263 (N.D.
1987). In response, the legislature passed the current version of the election contest statute,
which provides, “[l]egislative election contests must be determined in court as provided in
this chapter for other contests. No legislative election may be contested before either house
of the legislative assembly.” N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-16-10 (2009).
Hawaii’s Constitution provides both that “[e]ach house shall be the judge of the
elections, returns and qualifications of its own members,” HAW. CONST. art. III, § 12, and
that “[c]ontested elections shall be determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in such
manner as shall be provided by law,” HAW. CONST. art. II, § 10. In 1969, the Hawaii
Supreme Court reconciled these seemingly contradictory clauses by ruling that the state’s
courts must resolve election contests for state legislature and that under article III, section
12, “the House’s function in judging the elections of its members extends only to
ascertaining whether the Constitution has been complied with; that is, whether the parties
have properly invoked the jurisdiction of a competent court to judge the contest.” Akizaki v.
Fong, 461 P.2d 221, 223 (Haw. 1969) (emphasis omitted). Hawaii’s statutes provide that all
election contests originate in the state’s supreme court. HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-172 (West
2008).
30. Oregon’s election law statutes provide that a plaintiff can bring a contest in the
circuit court to contest the election of a state senator or representative. OR. REV. STAT. §
258.036(1)(b) (2011). However, the Oregon Constitution provides that “[e]ach house when
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fact-finding process.31 To initiate an election contest, the challenger must file a
notice with the district court clerk, who submits a copy to the chief justice of the
state supreme court.32 The chief justice then provides both parties with a list of the
district court judges whose districts comprise the entirety or part of the contested
legislative district.33 If there is more than one judge that falls within the legislative
district, the parties alternate striking the names of the judges until only one
remains.34 That judge, applying the rules of evidence for civil actions, makes
findings of fact solely as to what number of legally-cast votes each of the
candidates received.35 The district judge then transmits his or her findings to the
appropriate house, which convenes a committee to report to the full house.36 The
full house decides which candidate is the winner.37 No appeal is permissible, either
of the district judge’s findings of fact or of the house’s final determination,
meaning that the district judge has complete discretion on the factual findings but
that the house has the ultimate say on who won the election and could even
disregard the district court’s ruling.38
Other states have similar mechanisms for allowing courts to render decisions on
election contests while preserving the legislature’s constitutional role in deciding
the election of its own members. For example, in both Minnesota and Ohio, the
courts make a final decision on the election contest and then transmit that
determination to the appropriate house for its consideration.39 In Pennsylvania, the
assembled, shall choose its own officers, judge of the election, qualifications, and returns of
its own members.” OR. CONST. art. IV, § 11. The Oregon courts have not been asked to
invalidate the conflicting portion of the election contest statute, although the Oregon
Supreme Court has held that “the constitution does vest the sole jurisdiction of this contest
[for election of a state representative] to be within the House of Representatives of the
Legislative Assembly.” Combs v. Groener, 472 P.2d 281, 283 (Or. 1970). It would seem,
therefore, that if presented with the question the Oregon Supreme Court would invalidate the
portion of section 258.036(1)(b) that permits judicial election contests for state
representatives and senators, although it would still allow contests for primary elections for
these seats. See id. at 283 (“There is justification for a distinction between a primary and
general election contest. The primary election does not make the winner of that election a
member of the legislative assembly. It is no more than a form of party nomination. It is not
the exclusive process for getting an aspirant’s name on the general election ballot.”).
31. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1442 (2000).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1451 (2000).
36. § 25-1451.
37. Id.
38. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1450 (2000).
39. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 209.10 (West 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.14
(LexisNexis 2012). In Minnesota, the district court decides the election contest by issuing
findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are appealable to the supreme court. The
district court, or the supreme court if the case is appealed, must then transmit the findings to
the appropriate house, which conducts a hearing and makes a final, unappealable decision.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 209.10. A judge in Ohio renders a decision on the election contest but
then transmits that decision to the appropriate House for it to decide the election of its own
members. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.14. Other states give the fact-finding power to a
separate commission. In Arkansas, for example, those wishing to contest an election to the
house of representatives must file a complaint with the Arkansas State Claims Commission,
which makes a nonbinding recommendation to the house of representatives on how to
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court of common pleas of the county in which the winner resides tries and
determines the election contest, but any claimant to the seat can present a petition
challenging the court’s decision to the proper house for a final resolution of the
contest.40 New Hampshire has a bipartisan Ballot Law Commission decide appeals
of recounts for state legislative offices, but no further appeal of the commission’s
decision is permitted “in view of the constitutional provision[] vesting in . . . both
houses of the general court exclusive jurisdiction over the elections and
qualifications of their respective members.”41
Sometimes a state’s judiciary may insert itself into a legislative election contest.
In Stephenson v. Woodward, the Kentucky Supreme Court overruled the Kentucky
Senate’s resolution affirming a sitting member’s qualifications for service, ousting
the member from office.42 The court determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the
dispute because it was not technically an “election contest” but instead a challenge
to the qualifications of one of the candidates to appear on the ballot.43
Commentators, however, lambasted the “extraordinary” decision as contradicting
the explicit text of the Kentucky Constitution, which gives the legislature the
authority to resolve election contests for its own members.44 This decision
exemplifies the difficulty inherent in an election contest regime in which an
institution narrowly reads the governing language vesting jurisdiction in another
body so as to retain authority for itself.
Thus, for state legislative contests in virtually all states, each respective house
has the final say in the election of its own members. In many states, however,
courts play a major role in this process. Indeed, some state courts render decisions
on the ultimate outcome and then transmit these findings to the house. In this way,
the house can maintain its sovereign role of determining the election of its own
members, although it does so with the backdrop of a judicial decision on the issue.
Of course, a house that makes a decision contrary to the court’s recommendation
might appear to be acting solely along partisan lines. This might affect its
legitimacy and, therefore, would suggest that the house should simply adopt the
judiciary’s determination.45 In many situations, then, the court’s decision would
seem likely to have an extremely strong influence on the house’s resolution of the
contest. The contrary, however, is also true: if the majority party has only a slim
lead in the chamber, it might seek to seat its ideological ally to bolster its hold as
the majority party regardless of what the court recommends. It is this concern of
partisanship and entrenchment that counsels toward using impartial decision
makers for election contests, as discussed below.46
In sum, virtually all states delegate to the legislative branch the power to
determine the election of its own members when a dispute arises. Some states,
however, augment this legislative authority with a significant role for the judiciary.
resolve the dispute. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 7-5-805(b)(1)(D)(2) (2011).
40. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3401-3409 (West 2007).
41. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 665:8(II), :16 (2008).
42. 182 S.W.3d 162 (Ky. 2005).
43. Id. at 167–68.
44. Salamanca & Keller, supra note 28, at 243–44.
45. See Parsons, Jr., supra note 28, at 234 (“The inherent political pressure placed upon
the Legislature by the supreme court’s announcement that a particular candidate has, in its
view, won a disputed election should be readily obvious to all.”).
46. See infra Part III.
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B. Election Contests Involving Governor and Lieutenant Governor
State processes for election contests involving the state’s chief executives vary
considerably. Some states involve the legislature heavily, others leave the decision
up to the judiciary, and some have special committees decide the dispute.
Additionally, certain states provide for several levels of appeal, while other states
allow no appeals at all.
1. Trial-Level Court Decides
The most common procedure states use for election contests for governor and
lieutenant governor is to permit the losing candidate to file suit in the trial court of
general jurisdiction, usually with an appeal allowable to either the court of appeals
or directly to the supreme court. Eighteen states provide that a party seeking to
contest an election result must file in the trial court.47 A nineteenth state,
Oklahoma, allows a party to file in the trial court but also grants jurisdiction over
contests to the appropriate election board.48 In these states, a party wishing to
challenge the election must simply file the suit in the normal trial court, albeit
sometimes within strict time guidelines.

47. ALASKA STAT. § 15.20.550 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-672(B) (2006); CAL.
ELEC. CODE § 16400 (West 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-324 (West 2009); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 102.168 (West 2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-523 (2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
18:1403 (2012); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 55, § 35 (LexisNexis 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 1336-103 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1102(2) (LexisNexis 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 19:29-2 (West 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-14-3 (West 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.116-04 (2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 258.036(1) (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-4-403
(LexisNexis 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2603 (2002 & Supp. 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
9.01(6) (West 2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-17-102 (2011). Note that some state
constitutions purportedly give the power to decide election contests to the legislature, but the
legislature has enacted statutes delegating that power to the courts. For example, Oregon’s
Constitution states, “Contested Elections for Governor shall be determined by the Legislative
Assembly in such manner as may be prescribed by law.” OR. CONST. art. V, § 6.
Nevertheless, the legislature has enacted a judicial election contest regime that specifically
includes gubernatorial elections. See OR. REV. STAT. § 258.036.
Some states have different rules for primary contests involving gubernatorial
elections. For example, in Mississippi, the State Executive Committee initially decides the
contest. Judicial review is available from a special tribunal composed of the members of the
original committee and a circuit court judge whom the chief justice of the supreme court
designates, with the circuit judge acting as the sole decision maker. That judge’s decision is
appealable to the supreme court, which may review the findings of fact only if the
commissioners on the State Executive Committee were not unanimous or at least three of
them did not attend the hearing with the circuit judge. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 23-15-923, -927
to -933, -937 (West 2003).
48. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 8-109 (West 1997) (A challenger may “contest the
correctness of the announced results of said election by filing a written petition with the
appropriate election board. . . . Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit any
proceedings in district court, which are otherwise authorized by law, alleging irregularities or
fraud in an election.”).
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Of the states that give a trial court jurisdiction to decide the dispute, four allow
an appeal directly to the state supreme court.49 By contrast, fourteen states’ statutes
either have no specific guidance regarding an appeal or provide that an appeal of an
election contest lies with the next-highest court in the state’s system or proceeds
like any other civil case.50 The final state in this group of nineteen, Louisiana,
provides that a direct appeal lies to the court of appeals sitting en banc.51
Two states—Michigan and New York—do not have separate election code
provisions discussing election contests, but each state provides a remedy of quo
warranto, which ultimately serves the same function by requiring the ouster of a
candidate who has already taken office but then loses a post-election challenge.52
Historically, quo warranto actions were the common law mechanism to contest an
election.53 Most states in the nineteenth century modernized their election contest
provisions by enacting statutes to replace the common law quo warranto
proceeding.54 Michigan and New York, however, retained and codified quo

49. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-325 (West 2009); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 56, § 59
(LexisNexis 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-14-5 (West 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-16-09
(2009).
50. ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.20.540–.560 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-671 to -678
(2006); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 16900 (West 2003); FLA. STAT. ANN § 102.168; GA. CODE ANN.
§ 21-2-528 (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 13-36-101 to -104 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 321117 (LexisNexis 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:29-11 (West 1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§ 8-109; OR. REV. STAT. § 258.085 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-4-406 (LexisNexis
2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2617 (2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 9.01(9) (West 2004); WYO.
STAT. ANN. §§ 22-17-101 to -114 (2011).
51. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1409(H); cf. 2 U.S.C. § 437h (2006) (providing for direct
appeal to the circuit court sitting en banc for nonfrivolous constitutional questions regarding
the Federal Election Campaign Act).
52. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.4501 (West 1996); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63-b
(McKinney 2010). Florida has a specific election contest provision but also allows for ouster
via quo warranto as another possible remedy. FLA. STAT. §§ 102.1682, .169; see Bailey v.
Davis, 273 So. 2d 422, 423 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (suggesting that a challenger may
initiate a quo warranto action even after he or she lost the election contest).
53. See, e.g., Steven F. Huefner, Just How Settled Are the Legal Principles that Control
Election Disputes?, 8 ELECTION L.J. 233, 235–36, 235 n.8 (2009); Lee, supra note 20, at 183
(“Prior to the adoption of statutory election contest provisions, the primary methods of
contesting elections were quo warranto and mandamus actions, common law actions to test
the validity of an election and compel the performance of a duty, respectively.”); see
generally GEORGE W. MCCRARY, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF ELECTIONS 279–
429 (4th ed. 1897).
54. See Stephen A. Siegel, The Conscientious Congressman’s Guide to the Electoral
Count Act of 1887, 56 FLA. L. REV. 541, 570–71 (2004) (explaining that “throughout the
nineteenth century, legislatures sought to modernize election challenges by creating election
contest laws to supplement quo warranto actions”). As Professor Foley explains,
[t]he most important early use of quo warranto in the United States to challenge
an incumbent governor’s reelection based on wrongdoing in the counting of
ballots occurred in Wisconsin’s gubernatorial election of 1855. This Wisconsin
Supreme Court decision, which ordered the incumbent governor to vacate his
office because he was not the rightful winner of the election, is considered the
Marbury v. Madison of Wisconsin law.
Edward B. Foley, The Founders’ Bush v. Gore: The 1792 Election Dispute and its
Continuing Relevance, 44 IND. L. REV. 23, 31 n.54 (2010) [hereinafter Foley, The Founders’
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warranto as the means to contest an election. The theory behind a quo warranto
action is that the candidate declared the winner has “usurped” the office.55 The
losing candidate therefore must ask the attorney general to initiate an investigation
into whether the winner has “usurped” the elected position.56 The attorney general
screens the case and has the discretion to decide whether to bring a quo warranto
judicial action seeking to “oust” the winner from office.57 In Michigan, if the
attorney general refuses to act a private party may bring suit,58 but in New York the
attorney general has complete discretion as to whether to proceed, and the quo
warranto action is the sole mechanism to challenge the election.59 The “usurper”
may suffer a penalty for taking the office: in both Michigan and New York, if a
court rules in favor of the losing candidate, the “usurper” is subject to a $2000
fine.60
Given the theoretical underpinning of a quo warranto action—that the purported
winner has “usurped” the position—the attorney general may not initiate the
proceeding until that person has assumed office. One virtue of this process is that
there will always be someone in office during the pendency of an election
challenge, which is often a drawn out affair.61 Then again, that person may not be a
legitimate office holder. Whether it is better to have someone illegitimately in
office to perform governmental functions or to leave the office vacant is a
normative question that Michigan and New York have resolved in favor of having
someone in office.62
Finally, two states—Kansas and Minnesota—require the supreme court to
appoint a special three-judge trial court to consider the evidence and decide the
election contest.63 Appeal lies directly to the supreme court.64
Most states that have a trial-level judge initially hear the dispute do not specify
the manner of selecting that judge. New Jersey, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wisconsin
are slightly different: in New Jersey65 and Wisconsin,66 the chief justice of the

Bush v. Gore] (citations omitted).
55. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63-b; Delgado v. Sunderland, 767 N.E.2d 662, 665 (N.Y.
2002).
56. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63-b(1).
57. Id.
58. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.4501 (West 1996).
59. Delgado, 767 N.E.2d at 665.
60. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.4515; N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63-b(3). New York also
subjects the usurper to arrest. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63-b(2).
61. Shannon v. Jacobowitz, 301 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254–55 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
62. Not all states leave the office vacant during an election challenge. For example, in
2004, Christine Gregiore assumed the governorship of Washington even while the election
contest proceeded. See In re Coday, 130 P.3d 809, 811 (Wash. 2006).
63. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1443 (2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 209.045 (West 2009); see
Sheehan v. Franken, No. 62-CV-09-56, 2009 WL 981934, at *1 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 13,
2009). This is analogous to the federal provision that authorizes a three-judge district court
to hear certain election law cases, with direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. See Joshua
A. Douglas, The Procedure of Election Law in Federal Courts, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 433,
455–56 [hereinafter Douglas, Procedure of Election Law].
64. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1450 (2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 209.09(2), .10(4) (West
2009).
65. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:29-2 (West 1999).
66. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 9.01(6) (West 2004).
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supreme court selects the judge to hear the case; in Oklahoma, the supreme court as
a whole may assign a judge to hear the contest;67 and in Utah, the chief judge of the
district court chooses the judge.68
Georgia has the most detailed provisions for selecting the initial trial judge. The
challenger must file the contest in the superior court of the county in which the
defendant resides.69 Georgia’s confusingly-worded statute then directs the clerk of
that court to have an administrative judge select a superior court judge to hear the
case.70 However, a different administrative judge must make the selection if the
initial administrative judge resides in the same circuit in which the contest will
proceed.71 Ultimately, Georgia’s procedure ensures that a judge of the district
(larger-level unit) but not the circuit (smaller-level unit) presides over the dispute,
which is likely to increase the possibility that the judge will be a neutral arbiter.
2. State Legislature Decides
The second most common procedure for deciding election contests for governor
and lieutenant governor is to have the full legislature determine the proper winner.
Thirteen states use this process.72 In these states there is no possibility of appeal;
the legislature has the final say in who won the election.73 There are also few

67. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 8-119, -120 (West 1997).
68. UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-4-404(1)(b)(i) (LexisNexis 2010).
69. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-523(a) (2008).
70. § 21-2-523(c). Georgia’s Superior Court, its court of general jurisdiction, is divided
into ten judicial districts. Each judicial district includes between one and eight judicial
circuits, corresponding to the counties within the district, for a total of forty-nine judicial
circuits within the ten judicial districts. Learn About Your Courts, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE COURTS OF GEORGIA, http://www.georgiacourts.org/index.php/component/content/
article/116.
71. § 21-2-523(d).
72. Twelve states require a joint session of the full legislature to decide the contest,
while a thirteenth, Mississippi, directs only its house to resolve the dispute. MD. CONST. art.
II, § 4; MISS. CONST. art. V, § 140; ALA. CODE § 17-16-65 (LexisNexis 2007); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 7-5-806 (2011); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11-205 to -207 (West 2009); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 34-2104 (2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 120.205(5) (LexisNexis 2004); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 293.433(1) (LexisNexis 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-182.13A(a) (West 2007);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-18-101 (2003); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 221.002(b) (West 2010); VA.
CODE ANN. § 24.2-804 (2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-7-2 (LexisNexis 2011).
A fourteenth state, Indiana, has seemingly contradictory provisions regarding
gubernatorial election contests. The Indiana Constitution provides that “[c]ontested elections
for Governor or Lieutenant Governor, shall be determined by the General Assembly, in such
manner as may be prescribed by law.” IND. CONST. art. V, § 6. Indiana, however, does not
have a law on the books describing such a procedure regarding how the General Assembly is
to resolve a gubernatorial election contest. Indiana law does provide that the State Recount
Commission, an administrative body, “shall conduct contest proceedings . . . resulting from
. . . an election for a federal, state, or legislative office,” which presumably includes
governor. IND. CODE § 3-12-10-4(b) (2005). It is unclear whether this delegation to the State
Recount Commission satisfies the constitutional mandate that the General Assembly resolves
election contests. See also supra note 47 (discussing a similar contradiction in Oregon’s
statutes).
73. MD. CONST. art. II, § 4; MISS. CONST. art. V, §§ 128, 140; ALA. CODE § 17-16-65;
ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-806; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11-205 to -207; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-
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procedural specifications for the process by which the legislature is to decide the
dispute. Some states, however, ask a special committee of the legislature to hear
testimony and prepare a report for the full legislature to consider. For example, in
Kentucky, the senate randomly selects three of its members and the house chooses
eight of its members to serve as an eleven-member board to make an initial
assessment of the contest and report its findings to the full legislature.74 Similarly,
the Tennessee Speaker of the House appoints seven members—not more than four
of whom may belong to the same political party—and the speaker of the senate
appoints five members—not more than three of whom may belong to the same
political party—to serve as a “Committee on the Governor’s Election” to take
evidence and hear objections.75
Three states—Delaware,76 Iowa,77 and Pennsylvania78—use a special committee
comprised of select members of the legislature to decide the contest without ever
involving the full legislature. Delaware’s Constitution provides that each house
must choose one-third of its members by ballot to serve on the contest committee,
and the chief justice of the supreme court or, in his or her absence, the chancellor,
shall preside and rule on the admissibility of evidence and other legal questions.79
In Iowa, each house selects seven of its members randomly to serve on the “contest
court.”80 The statute does not specify what happens if there is a seven-to-seven tie.
Iowa’s administrative regulations, however, do state that if the election contest
court finds that there were errors in the conduct of an election that make it
impossible to determine a winner, the state commissioner of elections must invoke
its emergency powers to order a repeat election.81 It is unclear whether a seven-toseven tie would constitute an “election contest emergency” under the regulations.
Pennsylvania’s process is much more complicated and interesting.82 Within five
days after receiving a petition contesting the election (signed by at least 100
registered voters), the senate and house must convene to choose a “select
committee” of thirteen members.83 The process is two-tiered: The senate first
selects twelve members and the house twenty-five members through a highly
specific process. For the senate, the names of each senator are written on “distinct
pieces of paper as nearly alike as may be, each of which shall be rolled up and put
into a box by the clerk of the house of representatives and placed on the speaker’s
table.”84 The secretary of the senate then must “shake[] and intermix[]” the papers,
draw them out, and put them alternately into three separate boxes on the speaker’s
2104; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 120.205(5); NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.433(1); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
163-182.13A(a); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-18-101; TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 221.002(b); VA.
CODE ANN. § 24.2-804; W. VA. CODE § 3-7-2.
74. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 120.205.
75. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 2-18-106, -109 (2003).
76. DEL. CONST. art. III, § 4.
77. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 58.1–.7 (West 2012).
78. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3314–20 (West 2007).
79. DEL. CONST. art. III, § 4.
80. IOWA CODE § 58.4.
81. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 721-21.1(47)(21.1)(14) (2012).
82. For a general overview of Pennsylvania’s post-election litigation procedures, see
Clifford B. Levine & David J. Montgomery, Post-Election Litigation in Pennsylvania, 41
DUQ. L. REV. 153 (2002).
83. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3314, 3315 (West 2007).
84. § 3314(a) (punctuation omitted).
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table.85 The clerk of the house then must “shake and intermix” the three boxes and
draw twelve names alternately from each box.86 Presumably, the three boxes are
meant to increase the random nature of the selection process. The house uses the
same process to select its initial twenty-five members, with the secretary of the
senate and the clerk of the house switching their administrative and selection
duties.87 Either of the parties to the contest can object to a selected member, which
requires the selection of a new member to the initial pool, but no further objections
are allowed if there are no remaining names in the boxes to take the challenged
member’s place.88 The clerk of the house and the secretary of the senate each then
draws the remaining names from the other chamber’s boxes and reads them aloud
to ensure there have been no mistakes or unfairness in the process so far.89
Once the legislature has selected its initial thirty-seven members, further
winnowing occurs: the parties to the election contest receive the names of the
twelve senators and twenty-five representatives, retire to an “adjoining” room, and,
in the presence of “a clerk or members appointed by the joint vote of members
present,” alternately strike off the names on each list until there are four members
of the senate and nine members of the house remaining.90 The parties have only one
hour to complete this process.91 The list of thirteen legislators serves as the final
“select committee” to decide the dispute.92 The select committee must meet within
forty-eight hours after its appointment to begin the proceedings.93 The chief justice
of the supreme court serves as the select committee’s presiding officer, who
decides questions regarding the admissibility of evidence and must “pronounce his
opinion upon other questions of law involved in the contest, but he shall not have a
vote on the final determination of the case.”94 Demonstrating the antiquated yet
charming nature of the statutory scheme, all witnesses that the special committee
subpoenas are entitled to “six cents for every mile of the distance necessarily
traveled by him in coming to and returning from the place of trial, and shall also be
allowed the sum of two dollars and fifty cents for every day he may be detained at
the place of such trial.”95
The current version of this law dates to 1937.96 However, the 1937 law is largely
identical to the provision from 1874 that formalized these procedures.97 Although

85. § 3314(b).
86. § 3314(c).
87. § 3315.
88. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3316 (West 2007).
89. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3317 (West 2007).
90. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3318 (West 2007).
91. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3320 (West 2007). The statute makes no mention of
what happens if the parties fail to finalize the list within the hour. However, the members of
each house may not leave the “conference room” where the initial process took place
“without permission” until the select committee is finalized. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
3319 (West 2007).
92. § 3320.
93. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3321 (West 2007).
94. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3324 (West 2007).
95. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3330 (West 2007). The Pennsylvania legislature has not
updated this law since its enactment to increase the amount of compensation witnesses
receive.
96. Pennsylvania Election Code, No. 320, art. XVII, §§ 1712–1730, 1937 Pa. Laws
1333, 1468–73.
97. Act of May 19, 1874, No. 136, 1874 Pa. Laws 208.
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the legislative history is not entirely clear, it appears that Senator Harry White
introduced the gubernatorial contest provisions as an amendment98 to an existing
house bill regarding election contests.99
It is possible that Senator White thought the detailed procedures necessary in
light of a political scandal in Texas involving that state’s gubernatorial election of
1873.100 As part of the Coke-Davis election dispute, the Texas Supreme Court
issued a decision in Ex parte Rodriguez, often referred to as the “semicolon case,”
in which the court rendered the general election unconstitutional.101 The Texas
Supreme Court determined that the election was illegal because it was held under
an unconstitutional law, the interpretation of which turned on the placement of a
semicolon in the section of the Texas Constitution that delineated election
procedures.102 This was controversial because the original election results showed a
huge victory for Democrat Richard Coke over incumbent Governor Edmund J.
Davis.103 Davis had appointed all three members of the Texas Supreme Court.104
Thus, the decision was seen as a simple power-grabbing maneuver from Davis’s
partisan supporters on the court so that Davis could remain in office.105
The decision set off a firestorm, with Coke trying to take office and Davis
asserting that he instead should remain as governor to give effect to the Texas
Supreme Court’s decision.106 As Coke and his supporters began to organize a
legislature for an inauguration and to assume office, Davis asked President Ulysses
S. Grant to send federal troops to prevent Coke from taking over.107 Eventually,
after President Grant refused to send troops amid the uncertainty of Davis’s right to
hold office, Davis succumbed and Coke assumed the governorship.108

98. JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, FOR THE
SESSION BEGUN AT HARRISBURG, ON THE 6TH DAY OF JANUARY, 1874 1098 (1874).
99. Id. at 1096–98 (citing H.B. 355, 1874 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1874)).
100. See Lance A. Cooper, “A Slobbering Lame Thing”? The Semicolon Case
Reconsidered, 101 SW. HIST. Q. 320, 320–29 (1998).
101. Ex parte Rodriguez, 39 Tex. 705 (1873).
102. Cooper, supra note 100, at 323. The section of the Texas Constitution provided:
“All elections for State, District and County officers shall be held at the county seats of the
several counties, until otherwise provided by law; and the polls shall be opened for four
days, from 8 o’clock A.M. until 4 o’clock P.M. of each day.” The Texas legislature,
however, had passed a law reducing the number of days the polls were to remain open to
one. Joseph Rodriguez was arrested for voting twice in the election, and he filed a writ of
habeas corpus alleging that the entire election was void because the law reducing the number
of polling days was unconstitutional. If the election itself was illegal, he could not have
committed the crime of voting twice. The Texas Supreme Court agreed, throwing out the
election results. Id.
103. Id. at 321.
104. Id. at 325.
105. Id. at 321–22 (noting that Democrats viewed the decision as “nothing more than the
legally indefensible product of partisan judges who were struggling to maintain the
Republican party’s power and to keep their own jobs,” and that even today “Texas lawyers
still are warned against citing Rodriguez as precedent and, further, are warned to think twice
before citing any Semicolon Court opinion”).
106. Carl H. Moneyhon, Edmund J. Davis in the Coke-Davis Election Dispute of 1874: A
Reassessment of Character, 100 SW. HIST. Q. 131, 139–40, 143, 147 (1996).
107. Id. at 146–47.
108. Id. at 150.
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The turmoil from Texas involving the state supreme court’s decision in favor of
the very person who had appointed the justices, combined with the feeling at the
time that corrupt political machines ran Pennsylvania’s legislature,109 likely led
Senator White to propose a process for resolving gubernatorial election contests
that would at least remove explicit partisan taint from the decision-making process.
That is, Texas’s experience with biased decision makers in the Coke-Davis
controversy, along with the political climate of Pennsylvania’s legislature,
counseled for a procedure that would require complete randomness in the selection
of those who resolved an election contest. Any partisanship in the tribunal would
be the result of the random selection method.
Although Senator White’s amendment detailed the specific contours of
Pennsylvania’s unique process, Senator White’s proposal no doubt originated from
Pennsylvania’s Constitutional Convention of 1790, which stipulated that a
committee of the legislature would decide the dispute:
In case of contested elections, the same shall be judged of and
determined by a committee to be selected from both houses of the
legislature, in such manner as shall be by law directed. During the trial
of contested elections, the speaker of the senate shall exercise the office
of governor.110
Pennsylvania has never had an election contest for governor or lieutenant
governor, so the state has never needed to invoke these processes. It is clear,
however, that the statute is intended to root out bias or fraud. For example, the
opposite chamber’s chief administrator—likely a person with very little interest in
influencing the membership of the special committee—plays a large role in the
selection process. Moreover, the pulling of names from one box and placement of
them into three additional boxes contributes to the random nature of the
proceeding. Ultimately, in light of the political climate at the time, the
Pennsylvania legislature adopting these provisions must have believed that this sort
of procedure would best eliminate bias or corruption and would be most fair for all
involved.
After the 2012 election, Republicans held a 27–23 majority in the fifty-member
senate and a 110–93 majority in the 203-member house.111 From a statistical

109. Robert Harrison, The Hornets’ Nest at Harrisburg: A Study of the Pennsylvania
Legislature in the Late 1870s, 103 PENN. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 334, 335–36 (1979).
110. FRANCIS SHUNK, THE PROCEEDINGS RELATIVE TO CALLING THE CONVENTIONS OF 1776
AND 1790, THE MINUTES OF THE CONVENTION THAT FORMED THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION OF
PENNSYLVANIA, TOGETHER WITH THE CHARTER TO WILLIAM PENN, THE CONSTITUTIONS OF 1776
AND 1790, AND A VIEW OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION OF 1776, AND THE COUNCIL OF
CENSORS
370
(1825),
available
at
http://www.duq.edu/Documents/law/paconstitution/_pdf/conventions/1776/proceedings1776-1790.pdf (emphasis omitted).
111. See Pa. Dep’t of State, 2012 General Election, Unofficial Election Returns,
Representative in the General Assembly, (Nov. 6, 2012), http://www.electionreturns.state.pa.us/
ElectionsInformation.aspx?FunctionID=13&ElectionID=53&OfficeID=13; Pa. Dep’t of State,
2012 General Election, Unofficial Election Returns, Senator in the General Assembly, (Nov. 6,
2012),
http://www.electionreturns.state.pa.us/ElectionsInformation.aspx?FunctionID=13&
ElectionID=53&OfficeID=12; Pugliese Assocs., Pennsylvania Election Results November, 2012
http://puglieseassociates.com/issues/november-2012-election-summary.
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perspective, then, Republicans would seem more likely to control a gubernatorial
election contest because they are more likely to have a majority of members on the
special committee. However, given that Democrats have a significant number of
representatives in the General Assembly, it is quite possible that the minority party
would secure a majority of seats on the special committee based on the random
draw. Either way, the chances of a complete balance in partisanship on the
committee are unlikely, meaning that Pennsylvania’s process, while guaranteeing
randomness and eliminating overt bias such as occurred in the Coke-Davis dispute,
will still produce a partisan decision maker. The skew of that partisanship will be
based on the respective numbers in the General Assembly at the time and the luck
of the draw.
3. State Supreme Court Decides
Five states provide that the state’s supreme court has original jurisdiction to
decide election contests for governor or lieutenant governor, with no possibility of
appeal.112 In two of these states, however, the supreme court must ask another
judge for assistance: in Illinois, the supreme court must appoint a circuit judge to
oversee the hearing or a recount,113 and in Missouri, the supreme court must
appoint a commissioner of the court to take testimony on points and facts that the
supreme court specifies.114
Two states have hybrid approaches that allow their supreme courts to be
involved from the outset. In Ohio, the chief justice of the supreme court or another
justice that the chief justice assigns initially hears the election contest.115 A party
may appeal to the full supreme court.116 Washington’s statutes allow a party to file
an election contest with the supreme court, court of appeals, or a superior court,
with possible appeal to the supreme court from a decision of the superior court.117

112. HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-174.5 (West 2008); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/23-1.1a
(West 2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 737-A(10) (2008 & Supp. 2011); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 115.555 (West 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-22-7 (2004). Maine used to send all
election contests to the Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices. ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, §§ 741–746, enacted by Laws 1985, c. 161, §§ 5, 6, repealed by
Laws 1993, c. 473, § 34. After a major ballot tampering scandal during a recount, however,
Maine repealed its previous election contest law and decided to send all contests besides
those for state legislature to its supreme court. SPECIAL COMM’N TO REVIEW THE ELECTORAL
PROCESS, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE 7 (1993) (“The Commission believes that
public confidence in the integrity of the recount process will best be served by having final
decisions made by the judiciary on direct appeal from the processing of the recount by the
Secretary of State’s office.”); see Editorial, Election Reform, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, June 14,
1993, at 6 (“The Maine House is expected to vote today on a wide-ranging election-reform
bill that makes sensible changes to a system badly out of date. Sprung from the ballottampering scandal of last December, the reform measure should reassure Maine voters that
the state’s election system has been returned to health.”).
113. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/23-1.8a (West 2010).
114. MO. ANN. STAT. § 115.561 (West 2003).
115. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.08(B) (LexisNexis 2012).
116. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.15 (LexisNexis 2012).
117. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.68.011 (West 2005) (providing that “[a]ny justice of
the supreme court, judge of the court of appeals, or judge of the superior court in the proper
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That is, a challenger may select the level of court in which to initiate the action—
and, as discussed below, in the 2004 gubernatorial election the parties invoked the
jurisdiction of both the Washington Supreme Court and several superior courts.118
The statutes allow an appeal from the superior court, and also grant the supreme
court original jurisdiction, but curiously do not specify whether an appeal is
allowed from the court of appeals if the challenger chooses to commence the action
in that court.119
Washington provides a recent example of a gubernatorial election contest statute
in practice.120 The 2004 gubernatorial election between Democrat Christine
Gregoire and Republican Dino Rossi was razor-thin, with Gregoire enjoying a 129vote margin of victory after recounts.121 After preliminary litigation regarding
which ballots to include in a recount and the secretary of state’s certification of
Gregoire as the winner, seven electors, including some on behalf of the Republican
Party and Rossi campaign, filed an election contest in the Chelan County Superior
Court.122 The contesting parties chose Chelan County rather than King County,
where most of the alleged improprieties took place, likely because they believed
Chelan County would be a more favorable forum given that it had voted
overwhelmingly for Rossi.123 The Democratic Central Committee intervened to
defend the election result.124 After conducting a two-week trial, the court issued an
oral decision in favor of Gregoire’s election, dismissing the contest.125 Rossi and
his supporters chose not to appeal this ruling to the supreme court.126 However,
several months later, four Rossi voters initiated an election contest in the
Washington Supreme Court, alleging various improprieties with respect to the

county” can order an election official to correct the results of an election); § 29A.68.120.
Washington’s Constitution actually confers upon the legislature the power to decide election
contests for governor. WASH. CONST. art. III, § 4 (“Contested elections for such officers
shall be decided by the legislature in such manner as shall be determined by law.”).
Nevertheless, the Washington Supreme Court, in 2004, asserted authority to decide an
election contest for that state’s gubernatorial election, stating,
We have assumed, without deciding, that chapter 29A.68 RCW confers
jurisdiction on this court to decide the present election contests. We reserve the
right to consider the question of whether the constitution gives the legislature
exclusive jurisdiction over governor’s election contests if it is properly raised at
some future time.
In re Coday, 130 P.3d 809, 817 (Wash. 2006). Thus, it is possible that the legislature would
decide a future gubernatorial election contest, although the supreme court took it upon itself
to perform that task in 2004.
118. In re Coday, 130 P.3d at 811.
119. §§ 29A.68.011, .120.
120. See, e.g., In re Coday, 130 P.3d at 809.
121. Ralph Thomas, Rossi Urges Revote to Fix “Mess”, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 30, 2004,
at A1.
122. Borders v. King Cnty., No. 05-2-00027-3 (Chelan Cnty. Super. Ct. June 24, 2005)
available at http://www.seattleweekly.com/content/printVersion/165891/; see In re Coday,
130 P.3d at 811.
123. See David Postman, Susan Gilmore & Keith Ervin, GOP Suit Doesn’t Ask to
Prevent Swearing-in, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 8, 2005, at A1.
124. In re Coday, 130 P.3d at 811.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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recount.127 The court ultimately dismissed three of the allegations for failure to
state a legally cognizable claim and the fourth based on the res judicata effect of the
Chelan County Superior Court’s decision.128 The court took “judicial notice” in
ruling that the earlier decision had res judicata effect on the original action in the
supreme court.129 That is, the Washington Supreme Court dismissed the subsequent
original action before it, based on the prior lower court’s resolution of the first
election contest.130 Washington’s strange statute, which allows a contest in
whichever forum the challengers select, resulted in the Washington Supreme Court
never reaching the ultimate substantive merits of the dispute, even though it would
have had original jurisdiction had the Chelan County plaintiffs filed there, and it
also would have heard the case if the first plaintiffs had appealed.
4. Other Tribunal Decides
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and South Carolina initially ask the Board of
Elections or a similar nonjudicial body to hear an election contest.131 South
Carolina allows a direct appeal of the State Board of Canvasser’s decision to the
supreme court.132 By contrast, there is no statutory right of appeal of the Rhode
Island Board of Elections’ decision, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court will only
grant discretionary review under a writ of certiorari based on “substantial issues of
law.”133
In New Hampshire, losing parties may appeal a recount to the five-member
Ballot Law Commission.134 The Commission is comprised of two members the
house of representatives selects (each major party chooses a member), two
members the senate selects (again, one from each party), and one member the
governor appoints.135 No member of the Commission may be an elected official.136
The supreme court may review the Ballot Law Commission’s decision, but the
Commission’s findings of fact are “final if supported by the requisite evidence.”137

127. Id. at 812.
128. Id. at 815–16.
129. Id. at 816 n.3, 817.
130. But see id. at 817–19 (Sanders, J., dissenting) (arguing that the prior election contest
did not bar the Supreme Court’s consideration of this case and that a contrary ruling “strikes
at the heart of the fundamental right of every person to access the courts”).
131. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 665:5 (2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-7-5(a)(11) (2003); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 7-17-250 (1977). As noted earlier, Indiana also seems to direct its State
Recount Commission to hear election contests for governor, but this provision conflicts with
Indiana’s Constitution, which leaves gubernatorial election contests to the legislature. See
supra note 72.
132. S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-17-270.
133. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-7-5(a); Van Daam v. DiPrete, 560 A.2d 953, 954 (R.I. 1989)
(“There is no statutory appeal provided from a decision of the Board of Elections. The
review by this court is discretionary and may be granted only after a showing of substantial
issues of law.”).
134. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 665:1(I), :5(I)(b).
135. § 665:1(I).
136. Id.
137. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 665:16 (2008).
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* * *
In sum, states use varying procedures for resolving contested elections for the
state’s highest office. Although infrequently invoked, virtually all states have
contemplated how to resolve a disputed gubernatorial election so that there are at
least procedures in place ahead of time. Many states delegate the authority to hear
the contest to the judiciary, with different rules and structures. Other states give the
legislature the power to decide the case. The table below summarizes the wide
variety of approaches states use to deal with this issue.

Type of Procedure for Election
Contests for Governor or Lieutenant
Governor
Trial court has initial jurisdiction
(including via quo warranto); appeal
allowed
Legislature decides (either joint
session, the House alone, or special
committee)
Supreme
court
has
original
jurisdiction
(including
hybrid
approaches)
Other
tribunal
has
original
jurisdiction
Special three-judge court with direct
appeal to supreme court

Number of States that Use This
Procedure138
21

16

7

4
2

C. Election Contests Involving Judicial Elections
Thirty-nine states elect some or all members of their judiciaries.139 They employ
elections for members of their general jurisdiction trial courts, appellate courts, or
both, either through regular elections or retention elections in which voters choose
whether to allow a judge to keep his or her position.140 Twenty-one states elect their
highest judges, and seventeen initially appoint supreme court justices and provide
for retention elections.141 Of course, election “contests” typically involve the

138. I placed Oregon in the “Trial Court” category, even though it is possible to read its
constitution as conflicting with its statutes, because the legislature has delegated
responsibility for gubernatorial election contests to its courts. See supra note 47. I placed
Indiana in the “Other tribunal” category for the same reason. See supra note 72.
139. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 790 (2002) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring); Judicial Selection Methods in the States, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY,
http://www.ajs.org/selection/sel_state-select-map.asp. The eleven states that do not have any
elections for its judiciary are Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia. Id.
140. Judicial Selection Methods in the States, supra note 139.
141. Id. The states that have elected supreme court justices are Alabama, Arkansas,
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declared winner of an election and the second-place candidate. Thus, it is more
likely that the states that elect their judges outright (as opposed to having retention
elections) would explicitly provide for how to deal with election contests for those
seats.
Several states use their judiciaries to resolve election contests for judicial
offices. Idaho, Missouri, Ohio, and South Dakota direct their supreme courts to
resolve an election contest for that same court.142 In Idaho, the governor “shall act
with them” if the supreme court “shall disagree.”143 In Missouri, a nominating
commission appoints supreme court justices for the initial term of one year, and the
justices then must go before the voters in retention elections for a twelve-year
term.144 Missouri’s election contest provision provides that the supreme court must
hear and determine questions related to the retention of these judges, but circuit
court judges hear election contests for lower courts.145 Ohio uses a single justice of
the supreme court to decide election contests for supreme court justices: the chief
justice must hear the case or appoint another justice to decide the dispute.146 The
governor names a justice to hear an election contest for chief justice.147 For judicial
contests for judges of the court of common pleas or below, however, Ohio has its
court of appeals decide the challenge, with appeal allowed to the supreme court.148
Finally, South Dakota grants original jurisdiction for contests involving “judicial
officers” to its supreme court.149
By contrast, Illinois circuit (trial) courts hear contests for supreme court and
circuit court judges.150 Louisiana also directs election contests for supreme court
justices and lower court judges to its trial courts, with appeal available to an en

Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana,
Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. The states that provide for appointment and then retention
elections for the state’s highest courts are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming. Id. New York does not have either outright
elections or retention elections for its highest court judges but holds elections for its lower
court judges. Id.
142. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-2004 (2008); MO. ANN. STAT. § 115.555 (West 2003); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.08(B) (LexisNexis 2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-22-7 (2004). In
Idaho, a district court hears contests of retention elections for the magistrate courts. IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 34-2004.
143. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-2004.
144. See Judicial Selection Methods in the States, supra note 139.
145. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 115.555, .575.
146. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.08(B).
147. Id.; see Moss v. Bush, 105 Ohio St. 3d 11, 2004-Ohio-2088, 821 N.E.2d 992, at ¶ 5.
This case involved an election contest for Ohio’s 2004 presidential electors, which the chief
justice—who was involved in his own election contest for reelection to his seat—heard
under section 3515.08. The chief justice refused to recuse himself based on a purported
conflict of interest regarding the election contest for his seat given that the governor had
appointed a different justice to hear his case. Id. at 993–94.
148. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.08(C); see, e.g., Squire v. Geer, 117 Ohio St. 3d 506,
2008-Ohio-1432, 885 N.E.2d 213 (applying “clear and convincing evidence” standard to
election contest for judge of court of common pleas).
149. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-22-7(1) (2004).
150. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/23-3 (West 2010).
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banc session of the court of appeals.151 Oregon, too, uses trial courts, with appeal to
the court of appeals like in a normal case.152 Pennsylvania appears to require twojudge courts for contests involving supreme court justices and three-judge courts
for contests for lower court judges.153 Tennessee does not specify the procedure for
election contests for supreme court justices (who have retention elections), but
provides that for a contested election for chancellor, the chief justice of the supreme
court must assign a chancellor from a different division to decide the case.154
Alabama and Nevada use a joint session of the legislature to resolve a disputed
supreme court justice election, with no possibility of appeal.155 However, trial
courts hear disputes regarding elections for lower court judges in both states.156
Moreover, it is still possible for the state and federal judiciaries to become involved
in an election contest for supreme court justice: In Roe v. Alabama, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified a question of Alabama
election law regarding absentee ballots to the Alabama Supreme Court, the answer
of which would allow the Eleventh Circuit to resolve the federal constitutional
issues surrounding the election of Alabama’s chief justice.157 The Eleventh Circuit
explained, “[b]ecause Alabama has barred its courts from entertaining statewide
election contests . . . there is only one state remedy in this case: a contest in the
legislature. The legislature, however, is not an adequate or proper forum for the
resolution of the federal constitutional issues presented.”158 The Alabama Supreme
Court answered the certified question by explaining that the federal court had
incorrectly stopped the state courts from determining whether all of the properly
cast absentee ballots had been counted and that Alabama law required the counting
of all ballots.159 A challenge to the ballots based on fraud, gross negligence, or

151. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18:1403, :1409(D), :1409(H) (2012).
152. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 258.036(1)(a), .085 (2011). Oregon statutes specify the venue for
election contests involving judges on the supreme court, court of appeals, and tax court.
§ 258.036(1)(a).
153. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3351, 3377 (West 2007); see In re Morganroth Election
Contest, 50 Pa. D. & C. 143 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1942) (three-judge court for election contest for
judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County). Although three
“president” judges hear an election contest for Class III cases (judges), two president judges
hear Class II cases (which include judges elected statewide). §§ 3291, 3351, 3377. There are
no reported election contests under the two-judge provision, nor does the statute provide the
procedure in the case of a tie.
154. TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-17-101(a) (2003); see Taylor v. Tenn. State Democratic Exec.
Comm., 574 S.W.2d 716, 717–18 (Tenn. 1978) (leaving open question of whether chancery
court would have jurisdiction for a contest of an election for supreme court justice in ruling
that it did not have jurisdiction for a nomination contest for that position).
155. ALA. CODE § 17-16-65 (LexisNexis 2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293.433
(LexisNexis 2008).
156. In Alabama, a joint session of the legislature hears disputes for court of appeal
judges, with no appeal allowed, but a probate court hears election contests for district and
circuit judges, with appeal to the supreme court. ALA. CODE §§ 17-16-65, -54, -61. In
Nevada, a trial-level court hears disputes for lower-level judges, and the court can refer the
matter to a special master. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293.413(3). The Nevada statute does not
mention appeals.
157. 43 F.3d 574 (11th Cir. 1995).
158. Id. at 582 (citation omitted).
159. Roe v. Mobile Cnty. Appointment Bd., 676 So. 2d 1206, 1226 (Ala. 1995).
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intentional wrongdoing, however, had to be raised in an election contest in the
legislature.160 Having received an answer to its certified question, the Eleventh
Circuit remanded the case to the district court for a trial on whether all absentee
ballots had been counted in the same manner as they had in previous elections so as
to avoid a federal equal protection or due process violation.161 Thus, even when
states try to exclude any judicial involvement in state election contests, federal
courts might enter the fray to resolve federal constitutional issues.
West Virginia has the most unique procedure for judicial election contests of
any of the states. Its statute provides that a special court must hear a dispute
involving elections to the supreme court of appeals or circuit court.162 The special
court is comprised of one person that the contestee selects, a second person that the
contestant chooses, and a third person that the governor appoints.163 Appeal lies
with the supreme court.164 There is apparently no prohibition on whom each party
may select. In McWhorter v. Dorr, McWhorter objected to his opponent Morrison
naming Dorr on the special court given that Dorr served as Morrison’s attorney in
preparing the notice of contest and was a Morrison partisan.165 The West Virginia
Supreme Court, however, ruled that the special three-judge court is a subordinate
legislative tribunal and not part of the judiciary, so a writ of prohibition could not
reach it.166 Accordingly, there was nothing to stop Morrison from naming his own
lawyer to the special court.167
In 1968, West Virginia again used its procedures to resolve a disputed judicial
election. Luke Terry contested the certification of Vance Sencindiver as the
properly elected judge of the thirty-first judicial circuit.168 Each side named a
member of the special court, and the governor chose the third member.169 The
special court divided two-to-one in favor of Sencindiver, with Terry’s appointee
dissenting.170 Terry appealed, and the supreme court affirmed the special court’s
decision.171 Although the court did not specify a standard of review, its analysis
reads as if it considered the election contest de novo, especially given that it was
construing the legal question of whether a state law that required the polls to close
at 7:30 PM was mandatory.172 Thus, it is unclear what role the special court
actually played in this decision beyond contributing its initial view of the proper
outcome.

160. Id.
161. Roe v. Alabama, 52 F.3d 300 (11th Cir. 1995); see Roe v. Mobile Cnty. Appointing
Bd., 904 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D. Ala. 1995), aff’d sub nom. Roe v. Alabama, 68 F.3d 404 (11th
Cir. 1995).
162. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-7-3 (LexisNexis 2011).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 50 S.E. 838, 838 (W. Va. 1905).
166. Id. at 840.
167. Id.
168. Terry v. Sencindiver, 171 S.E.2d 480, 481 (W. Va. 1969).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 481–82.
171. Id. at 485.
172. Id. at 483–84.
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In the remainder of states that hold judicial elections, the statutes do not provide
specific rules for election contests for judicial offices. Thus, presumably the general
provisions for election contests would apply.
In sum, only twelve of the thirty-nine states that elect their judges specify
procedures for tribunals to use to resolve election contests for judicial positions.173
There is little uniformity among the states that have enacted a procedure. A few
states use the judiciary or a modified form of a judicial body to resolve the case, but
two leave it up to the legislature. Moreover, the statutes frequently fail to provide
any guidance as to why the state chose a particular procedure or the goals behind
the processes enacted. Instead, judicial election contest procedures represent a
patchwork of schemes under which states must try to operate a fair and open
process.
D. Election Contests Involving Congressional Elections
Like most state constitutions, the U.S. Constitution provides that “[e]ach House
shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own
Members . . . .”174 Thus, the Constitution expressly delegates the authority to decide
election contests for congressional seats to Congress. This is a lasting legacy of our
Founding Fathers175 and a function of the separation of powers: as James Madison
explained in the Federalist Papers, “it is evident that each department should have a
will of its own, and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each
should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the
others.”176
However, state tribunals still have some authority in this area, both as a matter
of constitutional text and general practice. The Constitution delegates to the states
the authority to regulate the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections.”177
Various states have construed this language as giving them a role in deciding

173. In addition, Mississippi provides for contests for their primary, but not general,
judicial elections. MISS. CODE. ANN. § 23-15-923 (West 2003).
174. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
175. Morgan v. United States, 801 F.2d 445, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (explaining that “[i]n
the formative years of the American republic, it was the uniform practice of England and
America for legislatures to be the final judges of the elections and qualifications of their
members”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
176. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). As Justice Story explained,
If [the power to judge elections is] lodged in any other than the legislative body
itself, its independence, its purity, and even its existence and action may be
destroyed or put into imminent danger. No other body but itself can have the
same motives to preserve and perpetuate these attributes; no other body can be
so perpetually watchful to guard its own rights and privileges from
infringement, to purify and vindicate its own character, and to preserve the
rights and sustain the free choice of its constituents.
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 833, at
604–05 (5th ed. 1891), quoted in Morgan, 801 F.2d at 450 (alteration in original); see also
Salamanca & Keller, supra note 28, at 255.
177. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
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election disputes, even if the respective house might have the final say in the
matter.178
In Roudebush v. Hartke, the Supreme Court declared that state courts have the
authority to order a recount in a congressional election because this was merely an
administrative act that was consistent with the state’s power to regulate the “Times,
Places and Manner” of conducting an election.179 The Court explained,
[A] recount can be said to “usurp” the Senate’s function only if it
frustrates the Senate’s ability to make an independent final judgment. A
recount does not prevent the Senate from independently evaluating the
election any more than the initial count does. The Senate is free to
accept or reject the apparent winner in either count, and, if it chooses,
to conduct its own recount.180
Based on this language, some state courts have concluded that they may order
only recounts in congressional elections, while others have determined that they
can decide election contests so long as the respective house has the ability to make
an independent final judgment.181 Sheehan v. Franken, the judicial contest of
Minnesota’s 2008 U.S. Senate election between Norm Coleman and Al Franken
that ended after the Minnesota Supreme Court resolved the case in favor of
Franken, is a recent example of a state judicial proceeding that would not have
precluded ultimate resolution of the election in Congress.182 Under Minnesota law,
Minnesota’s chief justice appointed a three-judge panel to hear the contest, which
ruled in favor of Franken.183 Coleman then appealed directly to the Minnesota
Supreme Court, which also upheld the election result.184 At that point Coleman
conceded the race.185 But if he had wished to continue the fight, he could have
petitioned the U.S. Senate to determine if he was the proper winner.
Congress exercises its constitutional role as the “Judge of the Elections,” at least
for House seats, through the Federal Contested Elections Act.186 Under this Act, a

178. See Kristen R. Lisk, Note, The Resolution of Contested Elections in the U.S. House
of Representatives: Why State Courts Should Not Help with the House Work, 83 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1213, 1225 n.64 (2008).
179. 405 U.S. 15, 21 (1972).
180. Id. at 25–26.
181. See Lisk, supra note 178, at 1225–28.
182. Sheehan v. Franken, 767 N.W.2d 453 (Minn. 2009) (per curiam).
183. See Sheehan v. Franken, No. 62-CV-09-56, 2009 WL 981934 (Minn. Dist. Apr. 13,
2009).
184. Sheehan, 767 N.W.2d at 456. The relevant Minnesota statute provides that the “only
question to be decided by the court is which party to the contest received the highest number
of votes legally cast at the election and is therefore entitled to receive the certificate of
election.” MINN. STAT. § 209.12 (West 2009). The court must “certify and forward the files
and records of the proceedings, with all the evidence taken, to the presiding officer of the
Senate or the House of Representatives of the United States.” Id.
185. See P.J. Huffstutter & James Oliphant, Franken Win Alters Power Equation; He’ll
Give Democrats a 60-Vote Supermajority, But Senate Vagaries Can Override Numbers, L.A.
TIMES, July 1, 2009, at A1.
186. 2 U.S.C. §§ 381–96 (2006). Congress has not enacted similar rules for contested
Senate races.
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losing candidate who wishes to contest the election of a member of the U.S. House
of Representatives must file a notice of election contest with the clerk within thirty
days of the state election official’s certification of the election result.187 The statute
provides judicial-type rules for gathering evidence and conducting depositions.188
The matter then proceeds before the Committee on House Oversight of the House
of Representatives.189 That Committee appoints a task force with representatives
from both parties to conduct a full investigation and submit its findings to the
Committee, which then votes on the matter and issues a report for the full House’s
consideration.190 The House has decided several hundred election contests
throughout history.191
Aside from this federal statutory mechanism, several states have adopted
specific procedures for handling election contests for congressional seats. The types
of processes states have enacted for resolving contested congressional elections run
the gamut. On one end of the spectrum are states that have promulgated highly
specialized procedures for handling congressional election contests. Connecticut,
Indiana, Iowa, New Hampshire, and South Carolina all exemplify this approach. In
Connecticut, the losing candidate can present an election contest to any justice of
the supreme court, who, along with two other justices of the supreme court that the
chief court administrator selects, decides the case.192 The statute has explicit timing
requirements: a losing candidate must file a complaint within fourteen days after
the election (or seven days after a manual tabulation of paper ballots), and the court
must hear the case within three to five days.193 The court also must act quickly,
rendering a decision “before the first Monday after the second Wednesday in
December.”194
In Iowa, the special court to hear congressional election contests consists of the
chief justice of the supreme court and four judges of the district court that the full
supreme court selects.195 Two of the selected district court judges, along with the
chief justice, constitute a quorum, and the next most senior member of the supreme
court shall preside if the chief justice is unavailable.196 The members of the special
court must take an additional specific oath before hearing the case to uphold the
U.S. and Iowa Constitutions.197 The court must render its decision “at least six days
before the first Monday after the second Wednesday in December next
following.”198 No appeal is allowed.199

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

2 U.S.C. § 382.
2 U.S.C. §§ 386–91.
2 U.S.C. § 392.
See Lisk, supra note 178, at 1233–34.
See id. at 1235.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-323 (West 2009).
Id.
Id.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 60.1 (West 2012).
Id.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 60.3 (West 2012).
IOWA CODE ANN. § 60.5 (West 2012).
IOWA CODE ANN. § 60.6 (West 2012).
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Congressional election contests in New Hampshire go before a five-member
Ballot Law Commission.200 The New Hampshire Speaker of the House and
President of the Senate each select two of the members, one from each major
political party.201 The governor picks the last person, with the advice and consent of
the Executive Council (a separate elected body that is part of the executive
branch),202 and this person must be “a person particularly qualified by experience in
election procedure.”203 There are also five alternate members of the Ballot Law
Commission, selected in the same manner.204 Any general election candidate—
including congressional candidates—may seek an appeal of a recount decision
before the Ballot Law Commission.205 The statutes forbid any appeal of the Ballot
Law Commission’s decision on a congressional race:
No appeal may be made under this section in the cases of contested
elections for the offices of United States senator [or] representative in
congress . . . in view of the constitutional provisions vesting in both
houses of congress . . . exclusive jurisdiction over the elections and
qualifications of their respective members.206
Thus, New Hampshire gives its electoral administrative body oversight, in a
quasi-judicial manner, of congressional election contests but adheres to the
constitutional grant of final decision-making authority to each house of Congress to
determine the election of its own members.
South Carolina also delegates to its Board of Canvassers the authority to resolve
election contests for federal offices but allows an appeal to the state supreme
court.207 Indiana, too, provides for election contests for legislative seats before its
state recount commission, although its statutes focus more on recounts than on
contests.208
On the other end of the spectrum are states that expressly prohibit contests for
U.S. House and Senate elections. Kansas,209 Nevada,210 Ohio,211 and Texas212 all
explicitly exclude congressional election contests from their election contest
provisions. Ohio is perhaps most direct:

200. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 665:1(I) (2008 & Supp. 2011).
201. Id.
202. N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 60 (“There shall be biennially elected, by ballot, five
councilors, for advising the governor in the executive part of government.”)
203. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 665:1(I).
204. § 665:1(II).
205. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 660:1 (providing for recounts in “any” election), 660:2
(mentioning congressional elections in the schedule of fees required for recounts), 665:8
(discussing appeals of a recount decision) (2008 & Supp. 2011).
206. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 665:16 (2008 & Supp. 2011).
207. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 7-17-260 (providing for the board to decide election contests for
“federal officers”), -270 (1977 & Supp. 2011) (discussing appeals).
208. IND. CODE § 3-12-11-21 (2006 & Supp. 2011).
209. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1435 (2000).
210. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293.407 (LexisNexis 2008).
211. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.08(A) (LexisNexis 2012).
212. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 221.001 (West 2010).
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The nomination or election of any person to any federal office,
including . . . the office of member of congress, shall not be subject to a
contest of election conducted under this chapter. Contests of the
nomination or election of any person to any federal office shall be
conducted in accordance with the applicable provisions of federal
law.213
Thus, candidates seeking to contest a congressional election in these states may
bring the challenge only in federal court or the respective house. However, state
courts still sometimes manage to enter the fray. For example, in 2008, the election
for Ohio’s Fifteenth Congressional District was subject to intense litigation in both
state and federal court over disputes about the eligibility of particular provisional
ballots.214 This suggests that the Ohio courts found a meaningful distinction
between ballot eligibility issues and a formal election contest. Similarly, courts in
Texas still can hear election contests involving primaries for federal legislative
seats. Although the Texas election contest provision is inapplicable to “a general or
special election for the office of United States senator or United States
representative,”215 the Texas Court of Appeals considered an election contest
stemming from a 2004 Democratic primary for the U.S. House.216
In the middle are states that either refer to congressional election contests
obliquely or provide election contest provisions for any election without specifying
explicitly whether elections to Congress fall within the statute’s scope. For
example, in Georgia an aggrieved voter or candidate may contest “[t]he nomination
of any person who is declared nominated at a primary as a candidate for any
federal, state, county, or municipal office” and “the election of any person who is
declared elected to any such office.”217 The contester must bring the case to a
superior court and can appeal to the supreme court as in a normal case.218 Oregon219
and Vermont220 specify the venue for a congressional election contest but otherwise
do not provide any unique procedures. Pennsylvania separates election contests for
U.S. Senate and House: Senate disputes go before a two-judge court of “president
judges” of the court of common pleas; House election challenges are tried and
determined by the court of common pleas of the county in which the winner
resides.221 Arkansas law provides a process for contesting U.S. Senate elections—

213. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.08(A).
214. Ohio ex rel. Skaggs v. Brunner, 549 F.3d 468, 471–72 (6th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)
(remanding case back to the Ohio Supreme Court, which had jurisdiction over the original
mandamus action).
215. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 221.001(1).
216. Rodriguez v. Cuellar, 143 S.W.3d 251 (Tex. App. 2004).
217. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-521 (2008).
218. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 21-2-523, -528 (2008).
219. OR. REV. STAT. § 258.036(1)(a) (2011) (providing that the Circuit Court for Marion
County is the proper venue). A party can appeal the court’s decision to the court of appeals
as in a normal case. § 258.085.
220. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2603(c) (2002 & Supp. 2011) (providing that parties
wishing to contest an election for a congressional seat must file in the Superior Court for
Washington County).
221. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3291, 3351, 3401 (West 2007). Senate election
disputes are considered “Class II” contests, and House election contests are “Class IV”
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by filing in the Pulaski County Circuit Court with an appeal allowed only within
seven days of the court’s determination of the election result—but does not
mention any similar processes for elections to the U.S. House of Representatives.222
Michigan has not enacted any procedures for deciding congressional election
contests, but it has promulgated detailed provisions for protecting the ballots during
the pendency of a contest occurring in the respective house.223 The supreme court
(for Senate races) or a circuit court (for House races) can issue a restraining order
to preserve the ballot boxes.224 The supreme court has further powers for Senate
contests: it can require delivery of the ballot boxes to the county clerk and appoint
three commissioners to open the ballot boxes and “place them in packages securely
wrapped and sealed and so marked as to show in what voting districts such ballots
were cast.”225
The remainder of states do not mention congressional elections at all in their
election contest statutes. Presumably, then, either election contests for these seats
are forbidden (meaning that a challenger must go to federal court or directly to the
respective house), or election contests fall within the general election contest
provision that applies to “any” election in the state.226
The analysis of the various mechanisms states use to handle congressional
election contests demonstrates the lack of consistency among the states. Most states
that mention congressional election contests channel these disputes to the state’s
courts, but alternatives also exist. Ultimately, Congress has the final say in any
dispute involving one of its own seats, making any “conclusive” determination
from a state entity actually advisory. State tribunals can nonetheless have a
significant influence in giving an appearance of finality, thereby convincing the
losing candidate to concede before a contest ever reaches Congress.
E. Election Contests Involving Presidential Electors
As is well known, U.S. citizens do not vote for President or Vice President
directly but instead vote for “electors” as part of the Electoral College.227 Each state
contests. § 3291.
222. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 7-5-801(b), -810 (2011).
223. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 168.109–.120 (West 2008) (providing special
provisions for preserving evidence in contested U.S. Senate elections); §§ 168.150–.155
(providing similar procedures for contested U.S. House elections).
224. §§ 160.109, 168.112–.113, 168.150–.151.
225. §§ 168.109, .112–.113.
226. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-4-402(1) (LexisNexis 2010) (“The election or
nomination of any person to any public office, and the declared result of the vote on any
ballot proposition or bond proposition submitted to a vote of the people may be contested
according to the procedures established in this part . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also
Bickerstaff, supra note 17, at 433 (“State recounts and possibly even state judicial election
contests can proceed as a means of policing state election laws, so long as they do not
interfere with the exclusive power of the respective houses of Congress to ultimately
determine the election dispute.”).
227. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2, 3; see also Att’y Gen. of the Territory of Guam v.
United States, 738 F.2d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Thus, citizens do not vote for the
President. Electors, appointed by ‘each State,’ vote for the President. . . . The right to vote in
presidential elections under Article II inheres not in citizens but in states: citizens vote
indirectly for the President by voting for state electors.”).
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appoints the electors “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.”228
Every state except Maine and Nebraska appoints its presidential electors based on
the statewide popular vote, while Maine and Nebraska appoint their presidential
electors proportionally based on the vote in each congressional district.229 Voting
for presidential electors in most states thus resembles gubernatorial and other
statewide elections. Consequently, challenges to the counting of ballots for
presidential electors resemble challenges to the counting of ballots for other
statewide elections and are presumptively subject to the state’s election contest
provisions.
It may seem odd that there is no federal constitutional mechanism for resolving
presidential election disputes. The President is a nationwide, federal position, even
if each state appoints the presidential electors who ultimately vote for President.
The Constitution does provide that the House of Representatives, voting through
state delegations, will decide a presidential election in the case of a tie in the
Electoral College or if a candidate does not receive a majority of electoral votes.230
But there is no constitutional mechanism for disputing the outcome of an election
or the awarding of presidential electors to one candidate or another.
Perhaps this is not so surprising. The Founding Fathers were unfamiliar with
election contests for executive offices.231 Moreover, “[t]he Electoral College in
each state is an institution of state government, and it is understandable if the
Framers (to the extent they thought about it at all) assumed that any disputes over
ballots cast for a state’s presidential electors would be handled within the state’s
own governmental apparatus.”232
The most famous disputed presidential election before Bush v. Gore was the
Hayes-Tilden controversy of 1886, during which Congress created a special
Electoral Commission of five senators, five representatives, and five Supreme
Court Justices to determine whether Rutherford B. Hayes or Samuel Tilden was the
proper winner.233 The Election Commission ruled eight to seven in favor of Hayes,
with Justice Joseph Bradley providing the tiebreaking vote for Hayes.234
In the wake of this dispute, Congress attempted to place some parameters
around a state’s independent resolution of presidential election controversies.
Under the Electoral Count Act of 1887, a state can guarantee that its electoral votes
will count if it creates, before Election Day, a scheme to resolve contests that will
ensure the resolution of all disputes at least six days prior to the meeting of
electors.235 This “safe harbor” provision was the focus of the Supreme Court’s

228. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
229. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 802 (West 2008); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-714
(LexisNexis 2008).
230. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
231. Foley, The Founders’ Bush v. Gore, supra note 54, at 26 (explaining that “[t]he
Founders could not look to their colonial history for experience on how to handle a dispute
over any kind of election for a chief executive”).
232. Id. at 25–26.
233. See John Copeland Nagle, How Not to Count Votes, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1732,
1743–45 (2004).
234. Id. at 1747.
235. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2006) (“If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the
day fixed for the appointment of the electors, for its final determination of any controversy
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decision in Bush v. Gore, in which the majority concluded that Florida would not
be able to complete an additional recount before the December 12 deadline and
therefore could not guarantee by law that the Electoral College would include its
electoral votes.236 A state that wishes to make certain that its electoral votes will
count under the “safe harbor” provision must promulgate a procedure ahead of time
that mandates a final resolution of the dispute before the federal statutory
deadline.237
Surprisingly, not every state spells out how to decide election contests for
presidential electors. Only twenty of the fifty states and the District of Columbia
provide specific guidance for these types of disputes.238 In the states that do
explicitly include electors in their election contest statutes, much as before, the
procedures lack consistency. Most processes involve the state’s judiciary: twelve
states channel the dispute to the judicial process.239 But the procedures for who
hears the case also vary among the states.
Five states provide for a trial court initially to consider the challenge, typically
with regular appeal to the court of appeals.240 By contrast, five states form a special
court to decide the dispute. Pennsylvania grants jurisdiction to resolve presidential
elector contests to the court with the “two nearest president judges.”241 Iowa and
Minnesota use the same process for presidential elector contests as they do for
contests to congressional seats, in which the state designates a special multi-

or contest concerning the appointment of all or any of the electors of such State, by judicial
or other methods or procedures, and such determination shall have been made at least six
days before the time fixed for the meeting of the electors, such determination made pursuant
to such law so existing on said day, and made at least six days prior to said time of meeting
of the electors, shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the counting of the electoral votes as
provided in the Constitution, and as hereinafter regulated, so far as the ascertainment of the
electors appointed by such State is concerned.”). For a history of the Electoral Count Act
and a discussion of its complexity and ambiguity, see Nathan L. Colvin & Edward B. Foley,
The Twelfth Amendment: A Constitutional Ticking Time Bomb, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475,
516–19 (2010).
236. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110–11 (2000) (per curiam).
237. See Lee, supra note 20, at 164.
238. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 16401 (West 2003 & Supp. 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 111-204 (West 2009 & Supp. 2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-323 (West 2009); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 15, §§ 5921–28 (2007); D.C. CODE § 1-1001.11(a)(2), (b)(1) (2011); IND. CODE § 312-11-19.5 (2005); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 57.1, 60.1–.7 (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 251435, -1437 (2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 209.01 (West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. § 128.100
(West 2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 665:16 (2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.08(A)
(LexisNexis 2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 258.036(1)(a) (2011); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3291
(West 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-17-260 (1977 & Supp. 2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 1222-4, -5, -6, -13 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-17-103 (2003); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN.
§ 221.002 (West 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2603(c)(2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-805
(2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-17-114 (2011).
239. These states are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Kansas,
Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Vermont, and Virginia. See infra notes
240–48 and accompanying text.
240. CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 16400, 16900 (West 2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 5927
(2007); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 258.036, .085 (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 12-22-7, -25
(2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2603 (2010). South Dakota law provides that appeal lies
directly to the supreme court as in a normal civil proceeding. See § 12-22-25.
241. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3291, 3351.
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member court to hear the case.242 Kansas uses the same election contest procedure
for presidential electors as it does for statewide offices: the supreme court assigns
three district judges to hear the dispute in the District Court of Shawnee County,
with direct appeal allowed to the state supreme court.243 Similarly, Virginia’s
statute covering primaries for U.S. Senate or any other statewide office also applies
to presidential electors.244 The contest is heard in the Circuit Court of the City of
Richmond before a special court composed of the chief judge of the circuit court
and two circuit judges from different circuits “not contiguous to the City of
Richmond” whom the chief justice of the supreme court appoints.245 The statute
also includes contingencies if the chief judge or the chief justice is unavailable, as
well as strict timing requirements.246 The provisions do not specify whether an
appeal is allowed.
Two states—Colorado and Connecticut—give their supreme courts original
jurisdiction over election contests for presidential electors. In Colorado, the full
supreme court decides the dispute.247 Connecticut uses the same procedure for
presidential elector contests as it does for congressional races: the losing party can
present the contest to any judge of the supreme court, and that judge, with two
other supreme court judges that the chief court administrator selects, decides the
case.248
By contrast, seven states employ a nonjudicial decision maker to resolve
election contests for presidential electors.249 Indiana,250 New Hampshire,251 and
South Carolina252 use the same board for presidential elector contests as they do for
congressional seats; New Hampshire and South Carolina allow appeal to the
supreme court, while Indiana’s law does not specify whether the losing party may
appeal.253
Tennessee and Wyoming do not use the judiciary at all in the process. In
Tennessee, an election contest goes before a Presidential Electors Tribunal
composed of the governor, the secretary of state, and the attorney general (who
serves as the reporter).254 In Wyoming, the legislature has the task of deciding

242. IOWA CODE ANN. § 60.1; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 209.01(2) (defining a “statewide
office” to include presidential electors), 209.045. See supra notes 182–84, 195–99 and
accompanying text.
243. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-1437, -1443, -1450 (2000).
244. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-805 (2011).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-11-204 (West 2009).
248. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-323 (West 2009); see supra note 192 and
accompanying text.
249. These states are Indiana, Missouri, New Hampshire, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, and Wyoming. See infra notes 250–58 and accompanying text.
250. IND. CODE §§ 3-12-11-1, -19.5 (2011).
251. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 665:8(II) (2008).
252. S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-17-260 (1977 & Supp. 2011) (explaining that the state board
decides protests or contests in cases of “federal officers,” which presumably includes
presidential electors).
253. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 665:16 (2008) (allowing for appeal to the supreme court);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-17-270 (1977) (allowing for appeal to the supreme court).
254. TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-17-103(a) (2003).
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presidential elector contests.255 Missouri also leaves an election contest for
presidential electors up to its legislature, but its statute includes detailed rules for
the evidence gathering process, allowing a judge to take and certify testimony in a
deposition.256 No appeal is allowed in any of these states.257
Texas avoids any formal adjudicatory method altogether and instead grants the
governor exclusive jurisdiction to resolve contests involving presidential
electors.258 Of course, giving the governor unfettered discretion could invite a
conflict of interest because the governor could tip the election to a political ally.
Finally, one state—Ohio—explicitly excludes presidential elections from its
election contest statutes, much like it does for other federal offices, instead
directing any resolution of presidential elector contests to “applicable provisions of
federal law.”259
As noted above, thirty states do not provide specific guidance on how to resolve
election contests for presidential electors.260 Thus, parties will invoke the particular
state’s regular election contest provisions, many of which apply to “any” election in
the state.261 Virtually all of these states involve the judiciary and ask a trial-level
court to make an initial assessment of the case. Ultimately, however, the lack of
explicit guidance on the proper procedures can prove problematic at a time when
political passions are high, as the Florida 2000 election experience demonstrated.
Additionally, the tight deadline under which states must certify who won their
presidential electors to qualify under the federal “safe harbor” provision makes this
lack of guidance for post-election disputes even more disconcerting.
* * *
If the foregoing discussion demonstrates anything, it is that election contest
provisions are all over the map—both literally and figuratively. There is little
consistency both with respect to the type of office under contention and among the
states generally. Some states use their judiciary quite liberally to resolve all sorts of
election contests. Other states leave it up to their legislature, create a special
tribunal, or give an administrative body such as the board of elections the authority
to resolve disputes.
A major omission from the multitude of mechanisms for resolving election
contests is the impetus behind their creation. Why have state legislatures enacted

255. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-17-114 (2011).
256. MO. ANN. STAT. § 128.100 (West 2003).
257. Id.; TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-17-103(a); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-17-114.
258. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 221.002(e) (West 2010).
259. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.08(A) (LexisNexis 2012) (“The nomination or
election of any person to any federal office, including the office of elector for president and
vice president . . . , shall not be subject to a contest of election conducted under this chapter.
Contests of the nomination or election of any person to any federal office shall be conducted
in accordance with the applicable provisions of federal law.”); see supra note 213 and
accompanying text.
260. See supra text accompanying note 238.
261. See Lee, supra note 20, at 172, 178; see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-521 (2008)
(applying election contest law to “any federal, state, county, or municipal office”); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 737-A(10) (2008) (applying statute to “all elections”).
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special procedures for election contests? Obviously there is something unique
regarding the manner of deciding the proper winner of an election. The next Part
identifies trends among the different types of procedures, uncovering several goals
legislatures implicitly consider in determining who should decide election contests
and delineating the way the cases must proceed. This analysis will help to start the
discussion of “best practices” for election contest provisions moving forward.
II. COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF ELECTION CONTEST PROCEDURES
As the description of the various modes of election contest procedures in the
previous Part demonstrates, in many ways state election contest processes are all
over the map. States differ widely in the types of procedures available to contest
elections to various offices. But that does not mean that there are no unifying
trends. This Part takes a closer look at three common features of election contest
provisions: statutory deadlines, specific procedural details, and appeals.
A. Statutory Deadlines
State election contest codes promote timeliness in resolving the dispute in two
ways. First, most states have strict provisions for when a complaining party must
file an election contest.262 Second, many state statutes provide either mandatory or
aspirational goals for when the court or other tribunal must resolve the case.263
Deadlines to file election contests are mandatory and strict. The Illinois
Supreme Court explained that “[c]ourts have no inherent power to hear election
contests, but may do so only when authorized by statute and in the manner dictated
by statute,” and therefore the court did not have jurisdiction to hear the dispute
unless the plaintiff had timely filed the election contest.264 The court then went
through a painstaking discussion of determining the triggering event for the running
of Illinois’s ten-day time limit for filing the action, ultimately concluding that a
plaintiff must file the case within ten days after the state board of elections (as
opposed to the county board) completes its final canvass of returns.265
Of the fifty states, all but four include specific deadlines for when a challenger
can bring an election contest.266 The deadlines generally range from as few as three
days after the election results are certified (primary elections for governor in
Maryland)267 to as long as forty days (all elections in Oregon).268 Montana and

262. E.g., ALA. CODE § 17-16-49 (LexisNexis 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(2)
(West 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1439 (2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 209.021(1) (West
2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.09 (LexisNexis 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17,
§ 2603(c) (2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.68.011 (West 2005).
263. See infra notes 267–280 and accompanying text.
264. Pullen v. Mulligan, 561 N.E.2d 585, 589 (Ill. 1990).
265. Id. at 589–95.
266. The four states that do not list deadlines in their statutes are Maine, Massachusetts,
New York, and Rhode Island. As discussed above, New York uses quo warranto, not a
statutory election contest procedure. See supra notes 52–60 and accompanying text.
267. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 12-202(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2010).
268. OR. REV. STAT. § 258.036 (2011). In a presidential election, Oregon’s statutory
deadline would authorize a contest action even after the federal safe harbor provision has
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North Dakota appear to be the outliers. Montana allows an action to “contest the
right of a candidate to be declared elected to an office or to annul and set aside the
election or to remove from or deprive any person of an office” for up to one year
after the election.269 In North Dakota, there is no time limitation for an allegation of
bribery or if the person elected cannot meet the qualifications to hold the office.270
Generally, however, a common timing requirement for filing an election contest is
between five and fourteen days after the completion of the canvass or certification
of the result.271 Most states include these strict deadlines to ensure that the election
does not drag on indefinitely.272
Many states also include specific timeliness requirements or goals directed to
the decision maker in their election contest provisions. For example, Arkansas law
provides,
If the case comes in regular term, it shall be given precedence and be
speedily determined. The judge may adjourn other courts in order to
hear these cases and may call another judge in exchange to sit in other
courts or vacate the bench in other courts and cause a special judge to
be elected to hold the court.273
Virginia directs its judges to decide election contests “as soon as possible.”274
South Dakota assists its judges in deciding cases quickly by authorizing the chief
justice of the supreme court to relieve a lower court judge of his or her official
duties so the judge can focus on the election contest.275
Some states set specific deadlines on when the court must hear or decide the
case, although the statutes do not provide any specific remedy for a failure to
comply. In New Jersey, a person seeking to challenge an election must file a
petition within thirty days after the election, and the judge must hear the complaint
within fifteen to thirty days after filing.276 States also may require a judge to rule
within a certain time period. For instance, in Arizona, the court must render its
decision within five days after the hearing.277 For Connecticut election contests to
federal office, the court must decide the case “before the first Monday after the
second Wednesday in December.”278 Similarly, some states limit the ability of
judges to adjourn the proceedings: Ohio law stipulates that the court cannot allow
adjournments for more than thirty days,279 while a Texas judge can continue a
passed and just before the meeting of electors. See 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2006).
269. MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-36-102(2) (2011). Moreover, “[t]he court is always
considered to be in session for the trial of contest cases.” § 13-36-206.
270. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-16-04 (2009).
271. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 3-12-8-5 (2005) (fourteen days); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-17-260
(1977) (five days).
272. See Lisk, supra note 178, at 1222 (“The value of finality represents the need to have
election contests resolved promptly so that elected officials may rightfully take office,
ideally when their terms begin.”) (emphasis in original).
273. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-802(b) (2011).
274. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-810 (2011).
275. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-22-18 (2004).
276. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:29-3, -4 (West 1999).
277. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-676(B) (2006).
278. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-323 (West 2009).
279. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.11 (LexisNexis 2012).
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contest involving a primary or a runoff election for only ten days, unless both
parties consent otherwise.280
The reasons for these deadlines are obvious: there is an inherent value in
deciding an election law case quickly.281 Protracted litigation draws out the
election, and continued uncertainty as to the winner might entrench litigants in their
positions and contribute to negative public discourse.282 It also can impede public
confidence in the election and even in the legitimacy of the ultimate winner.283 Of
course, strict deadlines also might have a downside: they may force a court to
render a decision before it is ready, eliminating a judge’s ability to proceed
deliberately in deciding a difficult question.
Prompt resolution of elections is good for our democracy.284 A state’s process
has resulted in a “failed election” when its contest provisions still do not allow the
state to identify a winner by the date on which the winner is to take office.285
Whether states choose to set specific deadlines or instead include merely
aspirational timeliness language in their codes is a policy choice up to state
legislatures, and it is one that states should actively consider.
In sum, timeliness is essentially a universal attribute of states’ election contest
provisions, employed for both primary and general elections and cutting across
types of elections. States place a high value on adjudicating disputed elections
quickly. Losing candidates must decide shortly after certification of the results
whether to continue the fight, and courts are admonished to decide cases quickly,
sometimes even under strict guidelines.
B. Specific Procedural Details Regarding the Judicial Process
As the analysis in Part I demonstrates, there are various structures states employ
to decide election contests, including giving the case to the legislature, the state
supreme court, a special nonjudicial tribunal, or the state’s regular court system.286
Using the judiciary is the most common mechanism. Therefore, it is important to
understand in greater detail the nuances of how states invoke the judicial process.
Typically, states that involve the judiciary in an election contest send the case to
the trial court of general jurisdiction. A common trait is to treat an election contest
like any other case, with the possible exception of including more stringent timing

280. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 232.012(e) (West 2010).
281. See Lisk, supra note 178, at 1222.
282. See Joshua A. Douglas, Election Law and Civil Discourse: The Promise of ADR, 27
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 291, 299, 302 (2012).
283. See Huefner, supra note 21, at 293 (“[I]t is important that representatives serve with
full authority and respect, rather than with unresolved questions about their legitimacy.”).
284. Id. at 292–93.
285. Edward B. Foley, The Analysis and Mitigation of Electoral Errors: Theory,
Practice, Policy, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 350, 361 (2007) [hereinafter Foley, Analysis &
Mitigation]. But see Justin Levitt, Resolving Election Error: The Dynamic Assessment of
Materiality, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 83, 143–44 n. 196 (2012) (arguing that a failed
election is one that declares the wrong person the winner and that leaving a seat vacant even
after the person is supposed to take office is less concerning for a multimember body that
can still function while the election contest is resolved).
286. See supra Part I.
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requirements such as a deadline by which a party must initiate the contest.287 For
example, Idaho directs that election contests “shall be held according to the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure so far as practicable.”288 Accordingly, even though the
election contest provisions usually appear in a separate part of a state’s code, Idaho
exemplifies the approach of asking the judiciary to act as it normally does in
resolving a dispute.
Although a few states use a three-judge panel of trial judges,289 in most of the
states a single judge initially hears the challenge. Moreover, there are not many
guidelines for selecting the judge that considers the case. Instead, the judiciary uses
its regular method for assigning judges. For example, in Alaska a person wishing to
challenge an election simply must file in the superior court, and the statute does not
specify any particular rule for how the judge is assigned.290
Of the states that send the case to a trial-level court, only a handful provide
specifics on who should select the judge hearing the dispute. In Minnesota291 and
New Jersey,292 the chief justice of the supreme court appoints the judge or judges
for the lower court, while in Kansas293 the entire supreme court assigns three
district judges to hear the case. In Georgia,294 Maryland,295 and Wisconsin,296 the
chief administrative judge for the judicial district assigns the trial court. Texas does
not provide guidance on how to select a judge but does stipulate that a judge is
disqualified from hearing the case if the judge’s district includes any territory
subject to a non-statewide contested election.297 All other states that send a case to
a trial-level court do not declare how that judge is assigned, meaning that the state
will use its regular method.298
A couple of states involve the parties in selecting the judges to sit on a special
court to resolve the case. As noted above, West Virginia uses a special threemember election court in which each side picks a judge and the governor chooses

287. See supra Part II.A.
288. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-2013 (2008). Idaho requires a party to initiate the election
contest within twenty days after the votes are canvassed. § 34-2008. See also N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 19:29-5 (West 1999) (“The proceedings shall be similar to those in a civil action so
far as practicable, but shall be under the control and direction of the court . . . .”).
289. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1443 (2000); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 12-203(a)(2)
(LexisNexis 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 209.045 (West 2009).
290. ALASKA STAT. § 15.20.550 (2010).
291. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 209.045 (West 2009).
292. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:29-2 (West 2009).
293. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1443 (2000).
294. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-523(c) (2008).
295. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 12-203(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2010).
296. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 9.01(6)(b) (West 2004) (directing chief administrative judge for
the judicial district to assign the trial judge if the election is held in more than one judicial
circuit, and directing the chief justice of the supreme court to make the appointment if the
election is held in more than one judicial administrative district).
297. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 231.004(a) (West 2010) (“The judge of a judicial district
that includes any territory covered by a contested election that is less than statewide is
disqualified to preside in the contest.”).
298. Many courts have a random-assignment method of selecting the judge for a case,
such as through lotteries. See Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping For a Venue: The Need for
More Limits on Choice, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 267, 292 (1996); Adam M. Samaha,
Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 47 (2009).
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the third.299 For county elections in Iowa, each side names a member of the contest
court, and those two members select a third.300 If the parties fail to select a member,
or if the two members cannot agree on a third person, then the chief judge of the
judicial district makes the selection.301
Just as states generally offer little guidance for how to select the judge or judges
hearing the case, only a few states provide rules on the specific venue most
appropriate for an election contest. Most states simply allow venue in the judicial
district in which the declared winner resides or where the election took place.302 A
handful of states, however, channel election contests to a specific court, typically in
the state capital, while often allowing venue in the county of the challenger’s
residence as well.303
Most states specify who may dispute an election and typically allow either the
candidate who lost, any eligible voter, or both to initiate an election contest.304 A
few states are slightly stricter and require a group of eligible voters to commence
the litigation.305 Some states even allow a political party306 or the county clerk who
conducted the election to file the case.307
States also provide instructions to challengers regarding what arguments they
may raise in an election contest, thereby specifying in essence a court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction in a challenge to an election result. The types of challenges are
fairly consistent across states. Typically, states allow an election contest for the
following: (1) misconduct, fraud, bribery, or corruption; (2) ineligibility of the

299. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-7-3 (LexisNexis 2011).
300. IOWA CODE ANN. § 62.1A (West 2012). Recall that for gubernatorial elections Iowa
uses a “contest court” of fourteen members of its legislature. See supra notes 77, 80 and
accompanying text.
301. § 62.1A.
302. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-14-3 (West 2003) (“Any action to contest an election
shall be commenced by filing a verified complaint of contest in the district court of the
county where either of the parties resides.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-22-7(2) (2004) (“As
to all other contests [not involving state offices or judicial officers of the Supreme Court],
[original jurisdiction exists] in the circuit court of a county which includes the locality where
the election or some part thereof was conducted.”).
303. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-672(B) (2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-801(b) (2011);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.1685 (West 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1438(a) (2000); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 120.155 (LexisNexis 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1404 (2012); MINN.
STAT. § 209.045 (West 2009); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1102 (LexisNexis 2008); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-182.14 (West 2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 258.036(a) (2011); TEX.
ELEC. CODE ANN. § 232.006(a) (West 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2603(c) (2002 &
Supp. 2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-805 (2011). Wisconsin does not specify a venue for the
trial court but requires all appeals of contests for statewide offices to go to the 4th District
Court of Appeals. WIS. STAT. § 9.01(9)(b) (West 2004).
304. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-521 (2008).
305. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 15.20.540 (2010) (allowing a candidate or ten qualified
voters to bring an election contest); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/23-1.2a (West 2010)
(allowing a candidate or a voter who submits a verified petition signed by at least as many
voters as would satisfy a nominating petition to file an election contest); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
19:29-2 (West 1999) (allowing a candidate or twenty-five voters to contest an election).
306. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-172 (West 2008) (allowing a political party directly
interested in the election to file an election contest); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-12-11-1
(LexisNexis 2011) (allowing the state chairman of the candidate’s political party to file an
election contest if the losing candidate fails to do so within the statutory deadline).
307. See OR. REV. STAT. § 258.016 (allowing a voter, candidate, county clerk who
conducted the election, or secretary of state (if the election involved a state measure, recall
of a state officer, or candidate for whom the secretary of state is the filing officer) to contest
the election).
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person elected to hold the office; (3) illegal votes being counted; or (4) legal votes
being rejected.308 Moreover, the challenged votes must actually have the potential
to change the outcome; courts will not sustain a challenge, even if there was
misconduct, upon a finding that the winner would be the same even with the
misconduct occurring.309 Thus, there is no omnipresent right to an error-free
election; a challenger must also be able to show that the errors would have actually
changed the result or at least put the outcome in doubt.310 Stated differently, a
challenger must show “but for” causation.
Moving to the evidence-gathering process, a few states have addressed whether
a court can compel voters to testify as to how they voted, with some states allowing
this practice and others finding it an unwarranted invasion of a voter’s privacy.
Texas exemplifies the former approach:
A voter who cast an illegal vote may be compelled, after the illegality
has been established to the satisfaction of the tribunal hearing the
contest, to disclose the name of the candidate for whom the voter voted
or how the voter voted on a measure if the issue is relevant to the
election contest.311
A challenger in a Texas House of Representatives contest invoked this statute in
early 2011 to compel voters to disclose for whom they voted.312
By contrast, the Arizona Supreme Court held that voters should not have to
make public how they voted because the testimony might be unreliable and because
it cuts against the goals of a secret ballot.313
Maine takes a hybrid approach, granting every person an evidentiary privilege to
refuse to disclose how he or she voted unless the court finds that the vote was cast
illegally or that the court should compel the voter to testify pursuant to the state’s
election laws.314 Washington similarly allows testimony regarding only specified
votes:

308. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 17-16-40 (LexisNexis 2007); IOWA CODE ANN. § 57.1(2)
(West 2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 258.016; TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 221.003; UTAH CODE
ANN. § 20A-4-402(1) (LexisNexis 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-17-101 (2011).
309. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 17-16-41; WASH. REV. CODE. § 29A.68.110 (West 2005).
310. Edward B. Foley, The Legitimacy of Imperfect Elections: Optimality, Not
Perfection, Should Be the Goal of Election Administration, in MAKING EVERY VOTE COUNT:
FEDERAL ELECTION LEGISLATION IN THE STATES 97, 99, 109 (Andrew Rachlin ed., 2006).
311. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 221.009(a); see also IOWA CODE ANN. § 62.17 (West 2012)
(“The court may require any person called as a witness, who voted at such election, to
answer touching the person’s qualifications as a voter, and, if the person was not a registered
voter in the county where the person voted, then to answer for whom the person voted.”).
312. Tim Eaton, Votes in Disputed Election Disclosed, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN
(Texas), Feb. 2, 2011, at B01.
313. Huggins v. Super. Ct. in & for Cnty. of Navajo, 788 P.2d 81, 83–84 (Ariz. 1990).
314. ME. R. EVID. 506; see also McCavitt v. Registrars of Voters, 434 N.E.2d 620, 630–
31 (Mass. 1982) (holding that a court cannot compel “good faith” voters to testify as to how
they voted, but leaving open whether a court can compel those who intentionally voted
fraudulently to testify).
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No testimony may be received as to any illegal votes unless the party
contesting the election delivers to the opposite party, at least three days
before trial, a written list of the number of illegal votes and by whom
given, that the contesting party intends to prove at the trial. No
testimony may be received as to any illegal votes, except as to such as
are specified in the list.315
This statute does not resolve, however, whether the court can compel the illegal
voters themselves to testify as to how they voted. Missouri, through its
constitution, also takes a hybrid approach, mandating the secrecy of ballots except
for contested elections, grand jury investigations, and civil or criminal trials
involving the violation of an election law.316
Trial judges usually act as the primary evidence gatherer and fact finder—but
not always. For instance, in Nebraska, an “official of the court” takes testimony,
administers oaths, and compels the attendance of witnesses.317 Missouri has a
similar provision, albeit not for the trial court: its supreme court has original
jurisdiction over an election contest for a statewide office, and the court can appoint
a commissioner to take testimony regarding specific points and facts that the court
directs.318 Moreover, although most states explicitly dictate that the court must
decide the case without a jury,319 Montana allows a judge to empanel a jury to
resolve questions of fact,320 while Georgia stipulates that the judge should decide
the case without a jury unless one of the litigants demands a jury trial and other
laws would permit a jury for that issue.321 In that instance the judge can require the
jury to return only a special verdict if the election was held in a single county and
must require the jury to return a special verdict if the election took place across
multiple counties.322
Finally, although most states that use the judiciary attempt to treat the case like
any other civil action, often judges are given special powers. For example, in New
Jersey, a judge presiding over the case has the authority to order any amendments
to the petition and to “compel the production of all ballot boxes, books, papers,
tally lists, ballots and other documents which may be required at such hearing.”323
Similarly, in South Dakota, the court may “make such order or orders as the court

315. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.68.100 (West 2005).
316. MO. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (“All election officers shall be sworn or affirmed not to
disclose how any voter voted; provided, that in cases of contested elections, grand jury
investigations and in the trial of all civil or criminal cases in which the violation of any law
relating to elections, including nominating elections, is under investigation or at issue, such
officers may be required to testify and the ballots cast may be opened, examined, counted,
and received as evidence.”).
317. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1103 (LexisNexis 2008).
318. MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 115.555, .561 (West 2003).
319. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:29-5 (West 1999).
320. MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-36-207 (2011).
321. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-526(a) (2008).
322. § 21-2-526(c). It is unclear why the Georgia statute requires special verdicts for
multiple county contests but merely permits them for single county contests.
323. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:29-5, -6; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.12
(LexisNexis 2012).
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deems necessary to bring about the expeditious and just determination of the
contest,” which can include shortening the time for an answer, actively managing
discovery, and appointing referees.324 In this manner, states attempt to give triallevel judges great discretion over managing the case. Some jurisdictions also
include special procedural protections in an election contest: in South Dakota and
Texas, for example, a default judgment is expressly prohibited.325 In Washington,
by contrast, the court can dismiss the case for want of prosecution.326
In sum, states have varying methods for using their judiciaries to resolve
election contests, but a few trends emerge: most often, states randomly assign a
judge to hear an election contest, although several states at least specify the proper
venue for a dispute. Most courts must decide the case without a jury, although in a
few states the court can appoint an official to take testimony and gather evidence.
Statutes usually include the substantive bases a party may allege to contest an
election, which are generally consistent across the states. Finally, most states
attempt to treat election contests like any other civil case, although some states give
judges additional powers. These trends are important to keep in mind when
formulating best practices for election contest procedures.
C. Appellate Review
Most state election contest statutes either provide for some form of appellate
review or stipulate that no review is permissible. The states that prohibit appeals
typically do so when either the legislature or the state’s supreme court decides the
case in the first instance.327 These states send the case directly to the final decision
maker. In the remainder of states, challengers are allowed to appeal the case up the
judicial ladder. Of course, there are some variations: In Connecticut, for example,
upon request from a party a superior court judge must make findings of fact and
then certify any questions of law that the parties contest to the chief justice of the
supreme court, who immediately calls a special session of the supreme court to
resolve the legal issue.328 A party who then ultimately loses the contest at the
superior court, however, can still appeal that court’s final judgment to the supreme
court, which may promulgate rules of procedure for a “speedy and inexpensive”
resolution of the case within fifteen days of the superior court’s final judgment.329

324. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-22-10 (2004).
325. See § 12-22-17; TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 221.004 (West 2010).
326. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.68.050 (West 2005).
327. See, e.g., 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/23-1.1a (West 2010) (“The Supreme Court
shall have jurisdiction over contests of the results of any [statewide] election . . . and shall
retain jurisdiction throughout the course of such election contests.”); IOWA CODE ANN. §
58.7 (West 2012) (“The judgment of the committee [of the legislature] pronounced in the
final decision on the election [for governor] shall be conclusive.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-17250 (1977) (“Appeals from decisions of the State Board shall be taken directly to the
Supreme Court on petition for a writ of certiorari only based on the record of the State Board
hearing and shall be granted first priority of consideration by the Court.”). The District of
Columbia also sends election contests to its highest court, the D.C. Court of Appeals, and
prohibits any appeals. D.C. CODE § 1-1001.11(b)(1), (b)(4) (2011).
328. CONN. GEN . STAT. 9-325 (West 2009).
329. Id.
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In Louisiana, appeals for most election contests must go to the full en banc courts
of appeal (instead of a three-judge panel), and the losing party may seek certiorari
review at the state supreme court.330
Although many states simply channel appeals through their normal appellate
process,331 other states skip the intermediate or court of appeals stage and allow a
party to appeal a trial court’s decision directly to the state’s supreme court. This
procedure streamlines the process and contributes to timeliness.332 For example,
both Kansas and Minnesota have their supreme courts appoint a three-judge court
to hear certain election contests and then allow direct appeal of the three-judge
court’s decision to the supreme court.333 Sometimes this expedited appeal
procedure is limited to statewide offices: in Minnesota, an appeal of an election
contest decision for all contests besides statewide offices must go first to the court
of appeals.334
Another common attribute of election contest appellate provisions is the
requirement that the appellant post a bond.335 The purpose of the bond is to ensure
that the party appealing the lower court’s decision will be able to cover the costs of
an appeal. It also has the corollary effect of, in theory, reducing the number of
appeals because it provides an added hurdle for litigants who want to continue the
fight.336 That is, the states that require appellants to post a bond are also sending a
signal that appeals in an election contest are less favored.
Many of the provisions related to appealing an election contest decision are
intended to foster prompt finality. For example, Minnesota permits, and North
Dakota requires, its appellate courts to hear election contest appeals in a summary
fashion.337 In Utah, an appeal does not stay the district court’s execution or further
proceedings, except for costs.338 Presumably, this both encourages finality of the
lower court’s decision and discourages appeals in the first place, as the parties
know that an appeal will neither prevent the lower court’s decision from going into
effect nor stop the winner from taking office.
Some state statutes are even ambiguous as to whether appeals are permitted.
Wisconsin’s election contest provision states that challengers can appeal an election
result after a recount first to a state trial court and then to the court of appeals

330. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1409(G), (H) (2012); cf. 2 U.S.C. § 437h (2006) (providing
that district courts may certify constitutional questions regarding the Federal Election
Campaign Act to the court of appeals sitting en banc).
331. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:29-11 (West 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-14-5 (West
2003).
332. See Douglas, Procedure of Election Law, supra note 63, at 458–59.
333. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-1443, -1450 (2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 209.045, .09(2),
.10(4) (West 2009).
334. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 209.09(1).
335. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 17-16-62 (LexisNexis 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1450
(requiring the posting of a bond of at least $500 “or such reasonable greater amount as the
court may order”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 209.09 (requiring a bond of $500).
336. See, e.g., Tal Finney & Joel Yanovich, Expanding Social Justice Through the
“People’s Court,” 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 769, 779 (2006) (explaining that requiring a bond
can reduce the number of appeals).
337. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 209.09(1); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-16-09 (2009).
338. UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-4-406(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2010).
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(which must be the Fourth District Court of Appeals if the election is statewide).339
The statute then provides, “This section constitutes the exclusive judicial remedy
for testing the right to hold an elective office as the result of an alleged irregularity,
defect or mistake committed during the voting or canvassing process.”340 This
limitation necessarily raises the question, is appeal permitted to the Wisconsin
Supreme Court as in a normal case, or does the statute give the court of appeals the
final say on the matter? This could potentially be an issue itself in a contested
election, especially if, as was the case in early 2011, the disputed election involves
a seat on the Wisconsin Supreme Court.341 Although news reports quoted the
Wisconsin Government Accountability Board Director as understanding the law to
allow an appeal to the state supreme court, presumably the candidate who wins at
the Fourth District Court of Appeals would argue that the supreme court would lack
jurisdiction over the case.342 This election was resolved based on the recount,
however, meaning that the courts did not have to answer this question.
Where an appeal is allowed, the scope of an appellate court’s review of a lower
tribunal’s decision is usually quite limited.343 Generally, the appellate court will
defer to the lower court’s findings of fact and will reverse the outcome only on
questions of law.344 This rule exists because of the recognition that first-level actors
have better ability to gather the facts, proximity to the events under review, and
expertise in conducting and reviewing electoral outcomes.345 As the Ohio Supreme
Court explained,
[t]he test for reversing a decision of a board of elections is not
necessarily whether this court agrees or disagrees with such decision,
but it is whether the decision of the board of elections is procured by
fraud or corruption, or whether there has been a flagrant
misinterpretation of a statute or a clear disregard of legal provisions
applicable thereto.346
Thus, the lower-level court has a lot of power in shaping the scope of an election
contest and the ultimate outcome. The appellate court will not reverse a lower court
or administrative board’s findings of fact unless they are against the “manifest

339. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 9.01(6), (9) (West 2004).
340. § 9.01(11).
341. See Patrick Marley, Jason Stein & Lee Bergquist, State Supreme Court Race
Headed for Likely Recount, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL (Apr. 6, 2011),
http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/119308059.html.
342. Id. Although it might seem odd to allow a court of appeals to be the final decision
maker in an election contest, Texas has a provision stipulating that, for a contested primary
election, “[t]he decision of the court of appeals is not reviewable by the supreme court by
certified question or any other method.” TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 232.014(f) (West 2010).
Presumably, Texas believes that primary election contests require quicker finality and
therefore only one level of appeal.
343. See WEINBERG, supra note 17, at 121.
344. See id.
345. See id.
346. State ex rel. Hanna v. Milburn, 161 N.E.2d 891, 893 (Ohio 1959) (emphasis
omitted).
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weight of the evidence,” an admittedly high standard.347 “[T]he pivotal role of a
reviewing court is to interpret the law in order to determine whether or not the trial
court’s legal conclusion is against the manifest weight of the facts.”348
For example, Louisiana explicitly prohibits a court from granting a new trial or
rehearing, “but a court, upon its own motion, may correct manifest error to which
its attention is called.”349 Thus, an appellate court can overturn a lower court’s
decision only for “manifest error,” demonstrating a high level of deference to the
trial court. By contrast, when an appeal is from a special election court comprised
of members that the parties select (such as in West Virginia), the appellate court
might have more leeway to “decide the matter in controversy, both as to the law
and the evidence, as may seem to it to be just and right.”350 The statute gives
broader authority to the West Virginia Supreme Court presumably because the
lower tribunal did not necessarily include members of the judiciary, meaning that,
in West Virginia’s view, there is less warrant for judicial-type deference to the
special court’s decision.
In sum, states that use their judiciaries to resolve election contests typically
allow an appeal to a higher-level court, unless the case must originate with the
state’s supreme court in the first place. Some states use their normal appellate
procedure, while others expedite the process by skipping the intermediate court of
appeals or including other procedural mechanisms. Moreover, many states limit the
ability of the appellate court to overturn the decision, especially with regard to
factual findings.
III. REFORMING ELECTION CONTEST PROCEDURES: TIMING, STANDARDS, AND
IMPARTIALITY
The preceding discussion is mainly descriptive and analytical; we now know
what types of laws are actually on the books with respect to election contests, and
we understand what general characteristics these statutes embody. To achieve the
value of robust, fair democracy, we must go one step further and identify what
goals we should seek to elevate in promulgating procedures for resolving election
contests. This Part discusses these goals and, recognizing that the most significant
reform state election codes need is fostering impartiality in the decision maker,
offers several potential models for creating an impartial election contest tribunal.
A. Goals for Resolving Election Contests
One of the starkest findings from the survey of state election contest statutes is
that there is little consistency among the states. Instead, states have a myriad of
methods for resolving election contests. These procedures vary even within the
state, depending on the office.351 Many of these provisions, however, seem to be

347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

See WEINBERG, supra note 17, at 124.
Id. at 127.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1409(I) (2012).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-7-3 (LexisNexis 2011).
See supra Part I.

2013]

PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN ELECTION CONTESTS

45

relics of a prior time and merely remain on the books due to inertia.352 There
appears to be no systematic adoption of state laws for resolving election disputes,
suggesting that the variation among states may stem from the reality of local
differences or the accident of history.
Therefore, a beginning step for reform is to have states consider whether the
dispute resolution systems currently in place make sense in today’s political
climate. Anticipating post-election litigation has become a routine part of campaign
strategy.353 Given this reality, states should evaluate whether the processes
currently in place are the most appropriate for the inevitable election contests that
will occur. Does it make sense to send the case to a single judge or a group of
judges? Who should decide the case? How quickly must a tribunal render a
decision? Should the provisions allow appeals? If nothing else, states should
appoint a commission or undertake legislative initiatives to determine if the current
procedures are consistent with the state’s goals in resolving post-election disputes:
to quickly and accurately determine the winner in the most fair manner possible.
Failure to do so will result in tumultuous election disputes occurring without clear
guidance on the best procedure for deciding the contest.
In analyzing the various forms of election contest provisions currently in effect,
some trends are apparent. Scholars have opined on universal goals or values that
should be inherent in any process for resolving disputed elections. One
commentator broke these goals down into four parts: first, “to give effect to the will
of the electorate” as a whole; second, “to give effect to the desire of the [individual]
voter”; third, “to avoid upsetting the results of an election where possible”; and
fourth, “to respect specific legislative commands.”354 Another formulation suggests
that election contest procedures must vindicate the goals of “legitimacy” (which
includes fairness, accuracy, and transparency), “finality and efficiency,” and “nonpoliticization.”355 Other vital criteria for the proper decision maker include lack of
bias, expertise in the substantive rules, and the ability to decide in a timely
manner.356 Universal valueswhich often conflict—entail: “(1) fairness and
legitimacy; (2) voter anonymity; (3) accuracy and transparency; (4) promptness and

352. See, e.g., 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3312–29 (West 2007); see supra notes 82–
110 and accompanying text.
353. Richard L. Hasen, Judges as Political Regulators: Evidence and Options for
Institutional Change, in RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 104
(Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang., eds., 2011) (“One theory
[for the rise in election law litigation] posits that election law has become part of a ‘political
strategy’ followed by politicians in an effort to manipulate the rules of the game to get
elected and to win in the event of an election recount or contest.”); Richard L. Hasen,
Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration to Avoid Electoral
Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 957 (2005) (referring to “election law as political
strategy”); Charles Anthony Smith & Christopher Shortell, The Suits That Counted: The
Judicialization of Presidential Elections, 6 ELECTION L.J. 251, 252–53 (2007) (discussing
litigation as an election strategy, particularly in presidential elections).
354. WEINBERG, supra note 17, at xviii.
355. See Lisk, supra note 178, at 1221–22.
356. See Nagle, supra note 233, at 1753–62.
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finality; and (5) efficiency and cost.”357 Underscoring these ideals is the desire for
impartiality in the decision maker.358
Synthesizing these concepts, three overarching goals emerge: (1) resolving the
election in a timely manner; (2) correctly and accurately determining the winner,
which requires clear standards for a decision maker to follow; and (3) doing so
through a tribunal that both is and is perceived as fair and just. These are the main
values a state should promote in considering its election contest provisions. The
remainder of this Article discusses ways to achieve these three goals, with a
particular focus on the creation of an impartial tribunal.
B. Improving Election Contest Processes
1. Timeliness
State statutes already address the first goal, timeliness, fairly robustly, albeit
somewhat erratically.359 There are two aspects to timeliness: first, most states
include a deadline by which a challenger may contest an election; and second, some
states have adopted a date by which a tribunal must decide the case or at least offer
guidance on how quickly a decision maker should rule.360 Most election contest
provisions provide clear deadlines for when to file and at a minimum allow courts
to move the case to the front of the docket, but there are variations. As noted above,
some states provide mandatory deadlines, while other states are more aspirational
in their timeliness language.361 Further, not all states have deadlines for when a
challenger may contest an election,362 and the deadlines vary among the states.363
In conducting a robust review of their election contest procedures, states should
consider both aspects of the timeliness equation. States that do not include
deadlines for filing a contest should follow the majority of states and adopt clear,
mandatory timing requirements. Additionally, states should enact specific timing
requirements that are binding on the decision maker. Aspirational timing
guidelines, such as simply moving the case to the front of the docket, are
insufficient to ensure prompt decision making. Strict deadlines help to promote
quick finality, which is good for the legitimacy of the eventual winner and the
process itself.364 Courts or other decision-making bodies can still make accurate
decisions even when faced with a strict deadline. Further, the deadline can be
dependent on the office in question and how quickly the office needs to be filled.
For example, an election for a single executive might require faster resolution than
an election for a multi-member body that can still function with a vacant seat.365

357. See Huefner, supra note 21, at 288.
358. See Foley, The Founders’ Bush v. Gore, supra note 54, at 34, 50, 70, 79, 81–82.
359. See supra Part II.A.
360. See supra Part II.A.
361. See supra Part II.A.
362. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
363. See supra Part II.A.
364. See Huefner, supra note 21, at 314–16.
365. See Edward B. Foley, How Fair Can Be Faster: The Lessons of Coleman v.
Franken, 10 ELECTION L.J. 187 (2011) [hereinafter Foley, How Fair Can Be Faster]
(proposing a model calendar for resolving presidential vote-counting disputes that includes
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Moreover, a specially constituted tribunal for a specific election contest will likely
need less time than a court that has a regular docket in addition to the pressing
election case.
Although states certainly can come up with their own deadlines, here is one
proposal: first, states should require challengers to an election result to contest the
election within three days of the certification. Challengers likely already have
participated in the administrative recount, so they have been intimately involved in
the post-election proceedings. It makes sense to give them a little bit of time to
craft their legal pleadings even when time is of the essence, but three days seems
sufficient. In addition, states should place deadlines on the tribunal deciding the
case: if the election is for a single executive or office, the tribunal must decide the
dispute within one week of when the new elected official is supposed to assume the
position. Those who hold offices such as governor need time to prepare for the job,
and the public needs finality, so a week seems about right—although, of course, the
tribunal should try to decide the case even sooner. If the election is for a multimember body that can function without the seat being filled, then the tribunal can
have some more time: perhaps it must decide within a month after someone was
supposed to take office. States should not allow election contests to drag on,
however, because that leaves constituents without someone to represent their
interests.
The point, of course, is not to mandate these specific deadlines on all states.
Instead, the goal is to prompt states to enact deadlines that apply both to
challengers and the decision maker so that the case is decided expeditiously. This
will allow candidates to move on, government to run smoothly, and the public to
have a sense of finality. Further, although the deadlines suggested here may seem
tight, the adoption of clear standards and the creation of a separate tribunal, as
discussed below, will help to temper these concerns because a single decisionmaking body will serve solely to decide the case. In sum, states should revise their
election contest codes to enact specific timeliness requirements for the resolution of
these disputes.
2. Clearer Standards
Professor Huefner has already devoted significant attention to the second goal,
providing guidelines for correctly and accurately determining the winner in a postelection dispute. In his article, “Remedying Election Wrongs,” he urged states to
define clearly
procedural matters such as: (1) who can be a contestant; (2) what
standard of evidence to require; and (3) how to expedite contests.
[States should also consider] several fundamental issues that any
[election contest] statute should address, in addition to specifying the
acceptable reasons or grounds for a contest. These include: (1) whether
and in what circumstances to permit proportional or statistical
adjustment of election results; (2) how readily to permit new elections
to occur; and (3) whether races for different kinds of offices deserve
different approaches to these and other issues. Another crucial matter is
specific deadlines).
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the extent to which primary elections ought (or need) to receive
different treatment from general elections.366
States would be wise to consider Professor Huefner’s proposed reforms, and, in
particular, to provide greater clarity to decision makers regarding the appropriate
evidentiary burdens on challengers and the permissible remedies for an election
failure.367
States can look to recent election contests to anticipate disputes over whether to
count certain ballots,368 the standard for determining the “intent of the voter,”369
and whether to require strict or substantial compliance with voting rules, such as
casting an absentee370 or write-in vote,371 among others. Legislatures should
consider the specific substantive rules the decision maker must use in resolving
these kinds of issues, as well as the appropriate remedy should one of these
problems arise. Crafting clearer guidelines would also eliminate the concern that
partisan judges are deciding cases at their whim, as the standards would constrain
their discretion.
When the laws for resolving disputed elections are unclear, “judges are free to
decide the case in accordance with their political preferences if they are so
inclined.”372 This fact ties into the reason for needing clear substantive standards:
granting biased election contest judges too much discretion is dangerous because it
gives decision makers wiggle room to impose their partisan views. “[T]he
conventional rules that most states use[] for adjudicating disputes over the counting
of ballots [are] sufficiently malleable that judges prone to partisanship [can] easily
manipulate those rules to support a decision for their favored candidate.”373 Thus,
“[w]hen the existing law is insufficiently clear on how to resolve the election
dispute . . . the law cannot constrain the courts, and judges are free to decide the
case according to politics, as they often appear to do—especially when the election
is a prominent one.”374 As Professor Huefner explains,

366. Huefner, supra note 21, at 311.
367. Professor Huefner specifically urged states to provide clear rules to judges for
(1) when to invalidate some portion of votes; (2) when, if ever, to use statistical
adjustments to correct vote totals for demonstrated errors; (3) in what
circumstances to compromise the anonymity of the polling booth by compelling
voters to reveal their ballot choices; (4) whether to adjust election rules once an
election is underway; and (5) when to take the dramatic steps of either
postponing an election or invalidating a completed election and holding a new
one.
Id. at 268.
368. See, e.g., Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219, 245 (6th Cir.
2011) (deciding whether to count certain provisional ballots).
369. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
370. Sheehan v. Franken, 767 N.W.2d 453 (Minn. 2009) (per curiam).
371. Miller v. Treadwell, 245 P.3d 867 (Alaska 2010).
372. Foley, Analysis & Mitigation, supra note 285, at 378.
373. Edward B. Foley, The McCain v. Obama Simulation: A Fair Tribunal for Disputed
Presidential Elections, 13 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 471, 477 (2010) [hereinafter Foley,
The McCain v. Obama Simulation].
374. Foley, Analysis & Mitigation, supra note 285, at 377.
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[E]lection contest provisions often provide courts with little substantive
guidance for determining whether a remediable election failure in fact
has occurred, and if so, how to remedy it. Instead, the focus of typical
contest statutes is on the procedures for bringing a contest action. Many
courts adjudicating election problems therefore have had to develop
their own standards for deciding if an actionable failure has occurred
and how to resolve it. The unsurprising result has been a variety of
judicially developed tests for when courts will uphold, invalidate, call
for a rerunning of, or themselves declare the winners of, a contested
election.375
The problem, of course, is that it is virtually impossible to create standards for
every conceivable election failure. Even if we were to enact a robust list of
potential election problems and how courts should resolve them, there will always
be something new that throws a wrench in the administration of an election—which
could potentially affect the result. This is why we also need a strong focus on who
is making these decisions. The manner in which a state resolves a disputed election
can impact the ultimate winner’s legitimacy.376 Thus, when a seemingly biased
tribunal determines the winner of an election stemming from a previously
unforeseen election problem, the loser—and the public—might think that the
outcome was a result of the tribunal’s ideological skew. But the converse is also
true: the more “neutral” the decision maker, the more secure we might feel in
granting that tribunal some discretion in interpreting the laws to resolve the
dispute—or at least in deciding the case when the substantive rules are not perfectly
clear. Because the substantive guidelines are impossible to define specifically for
every possible election failure, we need impartial decision makers so that, when
they do inevitably use some discretion in resolving the dispute, it is not seen as
merely a product of their partisanship. That is, there must be an additional
structural protection in the composition of the election contest tribunal to ensure
that the procedure of resolving a disputed election is as fair and unbiased as
possible.
3. Impartiality in the Decision Maker
The third goal—impartiality—is where states need the most work. A significant
feature missing from most states’ election contest provisions is a mechanism to
ensure the impartiality of the tribunal. States that include some way of addressing
bias in the decision maker—such as Pennsylvania, with its strange process of
drawing names from boxes,377 or New Hampshire with its five-member Ballot Law
Commission378—are outliers, and even those states do not completely balance or
eliminate bias from the tribunal. Indeed, Pennsylvania virtually guarantees bias by
giving authority to a randomly selected committee of the legislature that is likely to
skew one way or the other, although the process for selecting the members

375. Huefner, supra note 21, at 270–71.
376. Foley, Analysis & Mitigation, supra note 285, at 379; see also Douglas, Procedure
of Election Law, supra note 63, at 441.
377. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3314, 3318 (West 2007).
378. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 665:1 (2008).
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randomizes the direction of that skew. The more common approach is simply to
send the case to some forum in the state judiciary without regard to rooting out any
potential bias of those charged with resolving the dispute.379
Ensuring impartiality is one of the most important attributes of achieving a fair
decision-making process for election cases.380 The legitimacy of an election
dispute’s outcome depends in large part on the impartiality of the tribunal that
decides the case.381 Research suggests, however, that judges’ partisanship can
influence their decisions when resolving election disputes.382 This taints the
fairness in the tribunal’s resolution of the contest:
When cases like these are dependent on the personal identity of the
particular judges who happen to sit on the court at the time they are
decided (as is true whenever a four-to-three, or a thre-to-two [sic],
decision might have gone the other way with just one change in the
composition of the court), the risk is that the outcome will depend on
how many Democrats or how many Republicans hold those seats.
While that risk exists in other kinds of cases, it is particularly acute in
election contests. There is no point in letting the state’s supreme court,
rather than its legislature, resolve the dispute over which candidate will
become governor, if the court’s resolution will be just as politically
motivated as the legislature’s.383
As it stands, however, few states actually consider the ideology of the decision
maker in their election contest provisions. Many states have detailed statutes for
how to select who decides a disputed election, but there is little consideration for
minimizing ideological decision makers in that process. Some states attempt to
select a judge who will be “impartial” in the sense of not having a direct interest in
the election: in Georgia, for example, the trial judge must come from a different
circuit (but same district) as where the election took place.384 But this says nothing
about the ideology of the judge deciding the case, which is particularly concerning
given that the majority of states elect their judges. Indeed, judges who rely on
voters for obtaining or keeping their jobs are inherently political actors—even if the

379. See supra Part I.
380. See Douglas, Procedure of Election Law, supra note 63, at 442–43.
381. See Foley, The Founders’ Bush v. Gore, supra note 54, at 34.
382. See Kyle C. Kopko, Sarah McKinnon Bryner, Jeffrey Budziak, Christopher J.
Devine & Steven P. Nawara, In the Eye of the Beholder? Motivated Reasoning in Disputed
Elections, 33 POL. BEHAV. 271 (2010) (finding that the party identification of ballot counters
influences their ballot counting decisions). But see Kyle C. Kopko, Partisanship Suppressed:
Judicial Decision-Making in Ralph Nader’s 2004 Ballot Access Litigation, 7 ELECTION L.J.
301 (2008) (finding that state supreme court justices did not rule along partisan lines in cases
involving Ralph Nader’s attempt to appear on the presidential ballot in fifteen states);
Michael E. Solimine, Institutional Process, Agenda Setting, and the Development of Election
Law on the Supreme Court, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 767, 789–92 (2007) (suggesting that it is
unclear whether federal judges rule in partisan ways in election law cases).
383. Foley, Analysis & Mitigation, supra note 285, at 378; see also Foley, The McCain v.
Obama Simulation, supra note 373, at 477.
384. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-523(c) (2008).
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elections themselves are nonpartisan or retention elections—because judicial
elections by their very nature require judges to engage with the political process.
States that simply send an election contest to their judiciaries thus have a flawed
process, because there is always the risk of a partisan taint. Even if the judges are
perfectly fair, there still might be the perception of ideological bias, which
ultimately affects the legitimacy of the resolution process and the declared
winner.385 As Justice Breyer wrote in his Bush v. Gore dissent about the Electoral
Commission that resolved the Hayes-Tilden presidential dispute, the Commission
“simply embroiled Members of the Court in partisan conflict, thereby undermining
respect for the judicial process.”386 Thus, those states that ask their regular judges
to decide a dispute, or who do not have a mechanism to ensure equal representation
on the tribunal, should reform their procedural processes for election contests. The
same goes for states that allow a single judge to decide the contest. There is too
great of a risk in that setting that the outcome—or at least the public’s perception of
the outcome—will turn on the identity of the judge who happens to hear the case.
a. Proposed Solution: A Five-Member Panel with Two “Partisans” and Three
“Neutrals”
The solution to eradicating, or at least reducing, partisanship in election contest
outcomes is to ensure that the tribunal deciding the case represents each side of the
dispute.387 It will be virtually impossible to find truly impartial arbiters to comprise
the entire election court; many people, including those that are appointed by a
partisan executive or win an election for a judgeship, have political leanings that
may be difficult to separate when making a ruling that will affect political power.388
Thus, a decision-making body should include multiple individuals of different
backgrounds and ideological viewpoints. Building in a bipartisan structure is the
best way to ensure that the losing candidate cannot point to the ideological makeup
of the tribunal as the reason for his or her loss.389 It also may be beneficial to
include individuals with different backgrounds and expertise—such as judges,
board of election officials, and election experts—to foster a diversity of viewpoints.

385. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and
Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1408–09 (2001).
386. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 157 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
387. See Foley, Analysis & Mitigation, supra note 285, at 378; Foley, The Founders’
Bush v. Gore, supra note 54, at 34 (explaining that the legitimacy of a disputed election’s
outcome “require[s] the physical manifestation of evenhandedness by making sure that the
tribunal [is] composed of equal numbers from each of the two competing political parties”);
see also id. at 81–82 (advocating for impartial institutions “so that they will not be, or appear
to be, predisposed to tilt their decisions towards one candidate or another based on the
partisanship of the governing body”).
388. See, e.g., Foley, The Founders’ Bush v. Gore, supra note 54, at 79 (noting that
“politicians inevitably will be partisans” and, therefore, that we need “an institution that
protects the resolution of disputed elections from becoming hijacked by politicians from
either party seeking an electoral advantage”); Lisk, supra note 178, at 1243–44 (stating that
“the detrimental politicization risks associated with judicial resolution of election contests
must undoubtedly be avoided whenever possible” and detailing the threat to impartiality
embodied in Bush v. Gore).
389. See Foley, The McCain v. Obama Simulation, supra note 373, at 488, 502.
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To address these problems, states should enact an election contest regime that
(1) creates a multi-member panel of judges, political operatives, and experts who
have different backgrounds and expertise to serve as an election contest tribunal;
(2) gives an equal number of seats on the panel to those sympathetic to each
candidate, while requiring candidates to identify these prospective members when
they file their nominating petitions; (3) has the candidates or members of the panel
together pick mutually agreed-upon “neutral” members for the tribunal, or requires
a supermajority for any decision; and (4) denies the possibility of an appeal.390
Two recent election disputes—one real, one hypothetical—demonstrate the
efficacy of a multi-member body that includes “partisans” from each side. First, in
the Minnesota Senate contest between Norm Coleman and Al Franken, the
Minnesota Supreme Court appointed a three-judge district court to hear the case,
which included one Democratic-leaning judge, one Republican-leaning judge, and
one Independent judge, all from different parts of the state.391 The Minnesota
Supreme Court actively sought to achieve partisan and geographic balance in the
makeup of the court.392 This court was unanimous in its decision, and the
Minnesota Supreme Court easily affirmed, also unanimously.393 Second, in a
simulated election contest based on the 2008 presidential election between Barack
Obama and John McCain, Professor Foley created an election court to hear the
case, comprised of one senior federal judge known to be more liberal, one former
state supreme court justice known to be more conservative, and a third judge that
the first two judges selected jointly, who happened to be a former federal judge and
current law school dean.394 The court heard oral arguments from leading
practitioners on each side and rendered a decision that ultimately would determine
who won the presidency.395 Once again, the opinion in the mock case was
unanimous.396 This suggests that when a court has an equal number of members
“sympathetic” to each side, the partisanship of those judges cancels each other out
and the court is able to render a decision devoid of partisan considerations.
One problem with these approaches, however, is that having a three-member
panel with only one moderate could leave the decision in the hands of that
moderate judge. Although the two examples above produced unanimous opinions,
that is not guaranteed through this structure. If judges are prone to ideological bias,
then the court’s decision might often be two to one, with the moderate judge simply
siding with one side or the other.
Therefore, a better model would be to have a five-member panel, with one
“partisan” that each side appoints and three “neutral” decision makers that the two
partisans jointly select. Although a panel might work with seven or even nine

390. At this stage I am not advocating for a single, uniform procedure for all contests in
all states, particularly because sustained scholarly attention to this issue is at its infancy. But
states should consider these structural guideposts in reforming their election contest
provisions, which will be a significant improvement over the current ad hoc approach.
391. Foley, Lake Wobegone Recount, supra note 12, at 146.
392. See id.
393. Id. at 161.
394. Foley, The McCain v. Obama Simulation, supra note 373, at 489–91.
395. Id. at 493–96.
396. Id. at 497.
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members, five members seems to be the best size to ensure ease of administration
and will allow the “partisan” members to have a significant, but not overwhelming,
influence.397 To achieve diversity in expertise, at least two of the neutrals should be
actual judges with significant judicial experience, and at least one neutral must be
an expert in election administration. It is important for the tribunal to have both
judicial and election expertise so it can resolve the complex issues that will arise.
Having three neutrals allows the “moderate” decision makers to constitute a
majority, thus lending credibility to the notion that any decision is not based on the
ideological makeup of the court. The three moderate voices also can help to temper
any preconceived partisanship one of the candidate-appointed judges might exhibit.
To choose the two “partisan” judges, states should require candidates, when
filing nominating papers, to identify a person they would like to be part of an
election contest court, if needed. There would be no other limitations on whom a
candidate may select, meaning that candidates can feel secure that the tribunal will
include someone “on their side.” Selecting the “partisan” members of the tribunal
before the election will help to remove the intense scrutiny that would accompany
the choice in the heat of a post-election contest, potentially leading to less
ideological picks. Of course, even these two candidate-selected members must take
an oath to decide the case on the law and facts, not their loyalties to the candidate.
These two people would then select the three “neutral” judges, ensuring that at least
two have served in the judiciary for a set amount of time (such as the past five
years) and one is an expert in election administration. It makes sense to have the
candidate-nominated members select their “neutral” colleagues, as it will be easier
for them to choose moderate individuals and reach compromise given that they
must work together with these people on the panel. None of the “neutrals” may
hold elective office (besides judge) or have any ties (including making
contributions) to either campaign. The partisan members should be admonished
that they may not “trade” selections, with each picking another partisan, but instead
should endeavor to pick three truly neutral voices. The tribunal’s decision should
be final: given clearer standards and an impartial makeup, an appellate round will
not add anything to this process and could contribute to the sense that the
membership of the particular tribunal is what drives the decision.398
In sum, borrowing from and improving upon the models previously used that
have exhibited impartial decision making in election contests, states should enact
legislation that authorizes the creation of a special five-member election tribunal

397. Indeed, a seven- or nine-member panel might dilute the influence of each side’s
single “partisan” member too much. Having each side appoint more than one “partisan”
member of the panel might create too much administrative burden, especially when these
additional people must jointly select the neutral members.
398. Cf. Foley, How Fair Can Be Faster, supra note 365, at 191 (making a similar point
with respect to presidential elections). It still makes sense for pre-election litigation, or
regular lawsuits about election administration, to have multiple levels of review so that the
legal system can deliberate appropriately on the proper interpretation of an election statute.
See Douglas, Procedure of Election Law, supra note 63, at 450–51. Election contests are
different, however, because they occur immediately after the election and are about which
candidate actually won. In this context, states are wise to enact unique rules tailored to this
kind of dispute, including limiting the number of appeals to achieve the fastest resolution
possible.
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for post-election contests. The methods of selecting the members of the tribunal—
with each side appointing one person and those two picking the three “neutrals”—
ensures that, at least procedurally, the tribunal’s resolution of the contest will be as
impartial as practicable.
b. Other Potential Ways to Achieve Impartiality
Although the five-member tribunal described above is well-suited to meet the
goal of impartiality, there are certainly other ways for states to minimize bias in the
decision maker of an election contest. Professor Foley, with a plan similar to the
five-member tribunal, advocates for the creation of a specialized election court to
resolve election contests, comprised of two Democratic-leaning judges, two
Republican-leaning judges, and a fifth non-judicial member chosen by mutual
agreement of the other four.399 This type of body “would represent a balanced blend
of law and politics.”400 As mentioned above, however, having four partisans on a
five-member panel likely would make the non-judicial member the tiebreaking
vote, vesting too much power in one person to resolve the contest. An advantage of
the five-member court this Article proposes is that it allows for the inclusion of
more non-judicial members (although still ensuring a judicial presence), more
moderate voices, and at least one neutral election expert.
New Hampshire’s and West Virginia’s systems of choosing the tribunal are also
good models, although they need some tweaking. Recall that in New Hampshire, a
Ballot Law Commission—comprised of two members the house of representatives
selects (each major party chooses a member), two members the senate selects
(again, one from each party), and one member the governor appoints—resolves
most disputed elections.401 Further, none of the Ballot Law Commission members
may be an elected official, and the governor must choose a person with experience
in election procedure.402 West Virginia uses a special court for judicial election
contests, comprised of one person that the contestee selects, a second person that
the contestant chooses, and a third person that the governor appoints.403 Both of
these systems guarantee that each side to the contest has sympathetic decision
makers on the panel. They suffer, however, from the concern that the final member
of the body, whom the governor appoints, will skew the body toward a partisan
imbalance. A better solution would be either to have a mutually agreed upon person
fill the last spot or to require a supermajority vote for any decision. For example, if
a state wanted to copy New Hampshire’s five-member Ballot Law Commission
(with the governor selecting the fifth member), it should also require four votes for
any effective decision, thus necessitating at least one “crossover” vote for a
resolution of the contest. There would also have to be unpalatable consequences in
the event of a deadlock, such as the replacement of the members of the
Commission. Another idea is to require unanimous consent for the appointment of

399.
400.
401.
402.
403.

See Foley, Analysis & Mitigation, supra note 285, at 378–79.
Id. at 379.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 665:1, :8(II) (2008).
§ 665:1.
W. VA. CODE § 3-7-3 (LexisNexis 2011).
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the members of the election contest tribunal from a body that encompasses several
political viewpoints, such as the state supreme court in many states.404
States could also have a list of eligible people who can hear a dispute (using
criteria that demonstrates their neutrality), and the litigants could alternately strike
members of the list until there are a set number to hear the case. States could
further look to the rise of independent redistricting commissions for drawing
legislative maps as an analogy of how to create a partisan-balanced body to decide
disputes.405
Regardless of how states do it, the key point is that states have not thought much
about how to root out partisanship in their election contest procedures. This is one
significant reform that will improve the process of resolving disputed elections.
Moreover, states should consider how to eliminate bias in the decision maker for
every type of election. New Hampshire and West Virginia use the processes
discussed above for only certain elections. But there is no reason to limit the goal
of impartial decision making only to some elected offices. States should evaluate
their election contest provisions as a whole to decide who best can resolve postelection disputes.
There is an argument, of course, that partisanship should actually be part of the
resolution process. Legislatures resolve election contests for their own members,
and there is no suggestion that legislatures must do so impartially. If a legislature
acts unfairly, the theory goes, the electorate can vote against the incumbents the
next time around.406 The flaw in this reasoning is that election contests are not
about which candidate is the best person politically to serve in the position; they are
instead about whether particular votes should count or whether there was an error
in the election process.407 These disputes, although about a political office, are
nonpolitical in nature. They are about compliance with the state’s electoral code.
Therefore, it is inappropriate to leave the resolution of these elections solely to
political actors. Additionally, voters are highly unlikely to vote in a subsequent
election based on how their representatives voted in an election contest, particularly
if that contest involves a member from a different part of the state. Although most
legislatures have the power to resolve contests regarding their own members as part
of their own sovereignty, it might be wiser to follow Hawaii and North Dakota and
allow some form of review for election contests for state legislators.408
To be sure, states need not adopt the highly detailed Pennsylvania mechanism
for resolving disputed gubernatorial elections—in which members of the legislature
are selected randomly through successive drawing of names from boxes to serve on

404. See Foley, How Fair Can Be Faster, supra note 365, at 200.
405. See, e.g., J. Gerald Hebert & Marina K. Jenkins, The Need For State Redistricting
Reform To Rein In Partisan Gerrymandering, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 543, 556–58 (2011)
(“State-level redistricting reform, particularly in the form of independent redistricting
commissions, is absolutely necessary in order to fulfill the promise of government for the
people, by the people.”) (emphasis in original).
406. See Saul Levmore, Precommitment Politics, 82 VA. L. REV. 567, 569–70 (1996).
407. See, e.g., Huefner, supra note 21, at 270 (“Ultimately, in many close elections the
real fight therefore is not over whether to conduct a recount, but rather over which ballots to
count.”) (emphasis in original).
408. See supra note 29. This would require a constitutional amendment in many states.
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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the tribunal—to achieve partisan balance.409 In fact, that method likely would
create an ideological imbalance through the random selection process if one party
happens to have more names pulled than the other. States should nonetheless
consider how best to create an ideologically-neutral arbiter of election disputes.
Using a model discussed above, such as creating a five-member tribunal with three
“neutral” members and a diversity of expertise, is a good place to start.410
One final point is worth mentioning. States must promulgate procedural
guidelines for an election contest before it occurs; trying to create a system in the
middle of an actual dispute will be impossible given the stakes involved. It can also
lead to concerns of partisanship infecting the procedural rules selected and
therefore the ultimate outcome. Indeed, the post-election creation of the Electoral
Commission to resolve the Hayes-Tilden 1876 presidential dispute was itself
contentious, mostly because Congress was reacting to a current controversy in the
context of each side seeking a mechanism that would be most advantageous to its
candidate.411 Specifying ex ante the specific procedural rules for resolving election
contests can eliminate or at least reduce judicial discretion ahead of time and will
therefore help to create some stability when disputes arise.412
Of course, none of this is to suggest that we should encourage post-election
judicial proceedings. It is much better if states can reform their electoral codes so as
to avoid post-election battles.413 But perfection in election processes is
unrealistic.414 Therefore, states should carefully consider the manner in which they
resolve election contests and, in particular, who should decide the dispute. Clarity
and precision in procedural rules can help to ensure that the election contest process
will reveal the candidate who actually received the greater number of valid votes.

409. 25 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3312–30 (2007).
410. There is a secondary problem that also warrants attention: now that we know which
reforms are needed, how do we convince state legislatures—who necessarily won their seats
under the current regime—to change the current processes on the books? See, e.g., Heather
K. Gerken, Getting From Here to There in Redistricting Reform, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 1, 1–2 (2010) (noting that because “foxes are guarding the henhouse . . . we have to
do something more than appeal to self-interested political actors to ignore their self-interest.
We need to realign the incentives of the foxes with those of the hens, to redirect competitive
political energies into healthier channels.”). Hopefully, the recognition that a failure to
consider carefully a state’s post-election mechanisms might lead to electoral meltdown will
spur legislators to act.
411. See Nagle, supra note 233, at 1744–45.
412. See Foley, The Founders’ Bush v. Gore, supra note 54, at 68 (“In the post-2000
debate regarding whether strict or lenient enforcement of election rules is preferable, it has
become widely acknowledged that it is better, where possible, to sidestep this debate about
‘general principles’ by relying on specific provisions of state law that address the situation.
Thus, scholars urge states to take legislative positions on the debate between strict and
lenient enforcement, spelling out their own state-specific resolutions of this debate in as
much detail as they can.”).
413. See Huefner, supra note 21, at 289.
414. See Foley, Analysis & Mitigation, supra note 285, at 351.

2013]

PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN ELECTION CONTESTS

57

CONCLUSION
States should actively pay attention to the dispute resolution mechanisms in their
statutory codes. The analysis of current state election contest provisions suggests
three main reforms for states to consider as a starting point in revamping their
procedures. First, states should include mandatory timing requirements both for
litigants contesting an election and tribunals deciding the cases. Second, states
should adopt clear guidelines on how to address the substantive issues that are most
likely to arise in a post-election dispute. Finally, states should consider how, in
reforming their election contest statutes, they should handle the reality of ideology
infiltrating the decision-making process. In doing so, they should create
mechanisms to appoint a neutral, or at least ideologically balanced, decision maker.
These proposals are simply a starting place for reform. As noted above, planning
for post-election litigation has become a routine part of a candidate’s campaign
strategy. Given this reality, states would be wise to take a comprehensive look at
their election contest procedures, as they no doubt will be invoked more often in
the future. One needed reform involves a close examination of who should decide
the dispute, but there are many other aspects for states to rethink. These include,
among others, identifying who has standing to bring a challenge, the evidentiary
burdens on a challenger, the substantive rules to invoke, and the possible remedies.
To the extent the current statutes address them at all, states are widely divergent on
all of these characteristics of their election contest provisions. It is time for states to
consider the procedural aspects of their election contest statutes so as to ensure a
post-election process that will reveal, in the fastest, most accurate, and fairest way
possible, the true winner of the election.
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APPENDIX: SUMMARY OF STATUTORY PROCEDURES
FOR CONTESTING ELECTIONS

State
Alabama415

Alaska416

Arizona417

Governor/
Lt. Governor
Joint session of
the legislature;
no appeal

Trial court; no
guidance for
appeal process
Trial court; no
guidance for
appeal process
(statute applies
to “election of
any person
declared
elected to a
state office”)

State Legislature
Legislature
(respective
house)

Legislature
(respective
house)
Legislature
(respective
house)

State Judge
Supreme court
justice: joint
session of the
legislature, with
no possibility
of appeal
Lower court
justice: trial
court
Trial court; no
guidance for
appeal process
Trial court; no
guidance for
appeal process
(statute applies
to “election of
any person
declared
elected to a
state office”)

Congressional
Election
Not included in
the list of
contestable
offices

Presidential
Electors
Not included in
the list of
contestable
offices

Trial court; no
guidance for
appeal process
Statute
seemingly
excludes
federal
elections by
implication
(statute
discusses “state
office”)

Trial court; no
guidance for
appeal process
Statute
seemingly
excludes
federal
elections by
implication
(statute
discusses “state
office”)

415. ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 51 (state legislature); ALA. CODE § 17-16-65 (LexisNexis
2007) (governor); § 17-16-50 (state legislature); §§ 17-16-54, -65 (state judge); § 17-16-40
(congressional election and presidential electors).
416. ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 12 (state legislature); ALASKA STAT. § 15.20.540 (2010)
(grounds for election contest); § 15.20.550 (jurisdiction and time for contest); § 15.20.560
(providing for judgment of the court).
417. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 8 (state legislature); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-672
(2006) (“election of any person declared elected to a state office”); see § 16-676 (outlining
the responsibilities of the trial court but not mentioning any mechanism for appeal from its
decision).
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Arkansas418
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Governor/
Lt. Governor
Joint session of
the legislature;
no appeal

State Legislature
Senate:
Determined by
senate’s rules
House: Arkansas
State Claims
Commission
makes
nonbinding
recommendation;
house makes
final
determination

California419

Superior court
of any county
in the district;
appeal to the
court of appeals
as in other civil
cases (statute
applies to “any
election”)

Legislature
(respective
house)

State Judge
Circuit or
district office:
Circuit court
within any
county in the
circuit or
district wherein
any of the
wrongful acts
occurred
State office:
Pulaski County
Circuit Court; if
there are two or
more counties
in the district
and fraud is
alleged, any
circuit court in
the district may
hear testimony;
appeal to the
Arkansas
Supreme Court
(statute applies
to “any
election”)
Superior court
of any county
in the district;
appeal to the
court of appeals
as in other civil
cases (statute
applies to “any
election”)

Congressional
Election
Senate: Pulaski
County Circuit
Court, appeal to
the Arkansas
Supreme Court
House:
impliedly
authorized, but
no venue is
specified
(statute applies
to “any
election”)

Superior court
of any county
in the district;
appeal to the
court of appeals
as in other civil
cases (statute
applies to “any
election”)

59
Presidential
Electors
Impliedly
authorized, but
no venue is
specified
(statute applies
to “any
election”)

Superior court
of any county
in the district;
appeal to the
court of appeals
as in other civil
cases (statute
applies to “any
election”)

418. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-801 (2011) (right of action “in any election”); § 7-5-801(b)
(U.S. Senate); § 7-5-805(a) (state senate); § 7-5-805(b) (state house of representatives); § 75-806 (governor); ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(a)(4) (appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court).
419. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 5 (state legislature); CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 16400, 16200 (West
2003) (all offices except state legislature); § 16900 (appeals).
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State
Colorado420

Connecticut421
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Governor/
Lt. Governor
Joint session of
the legislature;
no appeal

Trial court;
direct appeal to
the supreme
court

State Legislature

State Judge

Legislature
(respective
house)

Impliedly
authorized; no
venue specified
(statute applies
to “any
candidate to
any office”)

Legislature
(respective
house)

No judicial
elections
besides probate
judges
Probate judges:
trial court;
direct appeal to
the supreme
court

Delaware422

Joint
committee of
the legislature
composed of
one-third of the
members of
each house; no
appeal

Legislature
(respective
house)

No judicial
elections

District of
Columbia423

N/A

District of
Columbia Court
of Appeals (for
City Council)

No judicial
elections
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Congressional
Election
Impliedly
authorized; no
venue specified
(statute applies
to “any
candidate to
any office”)

Presidential
Electors
Supreme court

Contest may be
presented to
any judge of
the supreme
court, who
decides the
case with two
other supreme
court judges the
chief court
administrator
selects
Superior court
(statute applies
to “an office to
be exercised in
and for any
county, district
or hundred”);
no guidance for
appeal process
District of
Columbia
Court of
Appeals

Contest may be
presented to
any judge of
the supreme
court, who
decides the
case with two
other supreme
court judges the
chief court
administrator
selects
Superior Court
of Kent County
is considered
“special board
of canvass”; no
guidance for
appeal process

District of
Columbia
Court of
Appeals

420. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 10 (state legislature); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-11-205 to
-207 (West 2009) (governor); § 1-11-208(1) (state legislature); § 1-11-201(1) (state judge
and congressional election); § 1-11-204 (presidential electors).
421. CONN. CONST. art. III, § 7 (state legislature); CONN. CONST. art. V, §§ 2–4 (judicial
appointments); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-323 (West 2009 & Supp. 2012) (congressional
elections and presidential electors); § 9-324 (governor and probate judges); § 9-325
(appeals).
422. DEL. CONST. art. II, § 8 (state legislature); DEL. CONST. art. III, § 4 (governor); DEL.
CONST. art. IV, § 3 (judicial appointments); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, §§ 5901–07 (2007)
(state legislature); §§ 5921–28 (presidential electors); §§ 5941, 5950 (other offices).
423. D.C. CODE § 1-1001.11(b)(1) (2011) (granting District of Columbia Court of
Appeals authority to review election results, including “initiative, referendum, and recall
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State
Florida424

Georgia425
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Governor/
Lt. Governor
Circuit Court of
Leon County;
no guidance for
appeal process
(statute applies
to “election or
nomination of
any person to
office”)

Trial court;
appeal as in
other civil
cases; heard by
a judge from
the same
district, but not
the same circuit
(statute applies
to “any primary
or election”)

Legislature
(respective
house)

Circuit court in
the county in
which the
contestant
qualified or if
the election
covered more
than one
county, in Leon
County; no
guidance for
appeal process
(statute applies
to “election or
nomination of
any person to
office”)

Congressional
Election
Circuit court in
the county in
which the
contestant
qualified or if
the election
covered more
than one
county, in Leon
County; no
guidance for
appeal process
(statute applies
to “election or
nomination of
any person to
office”)

Legislature
(respective
house)

Trial court;
appeal as in
other civil
cases; heard by
a judge from
the same
district, but not
the same circuit
(statute applies
to “any primary
or election”)

Trial court;
appeal as in
other civil
cases; heard by
a judge from
the same
district, but not
the same circuit
(statute applies
to “any primary
or election”)

State Legislature

State Judge

61
Presidential
Electors
Circuit court in
the county in
which the
contestant
qualified or if
the election
covered more
than one
county, in Leon
County; no
guidance for
appeal process
(statute applies
to “election or
nomination of
any person to
office”)
Trial court;
appeal as in
other civil
cases; heard by
a judge from
the same
district, but not
the same circuit
(statute applies
to “any primary
or election”)

measures as well as elections for a particular office”).
424. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 2 (state legislature); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168 (West 2008
& Supp. 2012) (circuit court is contest court for all elections but legislature); § 102.1685
(venue either in county where contestant qualified or Leon County); § 102.171 (contest of
election to legislature).
425. GA. CONST. art. III, § 4, para. 7 (state legislature); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 21-2-521, -523
(2008) (governing election contests in the trial court); § 21-2-528 (treating appellate review
of election contests as in other civil cases).
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State
Hawaii426
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Governor/
Lt. Governor
State supreme
court

Idaho427

Joint session of
the legislature;
no appeal

Illinois428

State supreme
court

State Legislature
State supreme
court; Hawaii’s
Constitution
confers the
power to decide
state legislative
election contests
to each house of
the legislature,
but the Hawaii
Supreme Court
declared that it
has jurisdiction
over an election
contest; see
footnote 29
Legislature
(respective
house)

Legislature
(respective
house)

State Judge
No judicial
elections

Supreme court,
“and in case
they shall
disagree, the
governor shall
act with them
in determining
the contest”
Trial court
hears all
contests for
judicial offices
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Congressional
Election
State supreme
court

Presidential
Electors
State supreme
court

Contest
impliedly
authorized; no
venue specified
(statute applies
to “any public
office”)

Contest
impliedly
authorized; no
venue specified
(statute applies
to “any public
office”)

No statutory
guidance

No statutory
guidance

426. HAW. CONST. art. 6, § 3 (appointment of state judges); HAW. CONST. art. 3, § 12
(state legislature); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 11-171 to -175 (West 2008) (any election); Akizaki
v. Fong, 461 P.2d 221, 223 (Haw. 1969) (state legislature).
427. IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 9 (state legislature); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34–2001 (2001)
(congressional election and presidential electors); § 34–2004 (state judge); § 34–2104
(governor); § 34–2105 (state legislature).
428. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (state legislature); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/23-1.1a
(West 2010) (governor); 5/23-13, -17 (state legislature); 5/23-3 (state judges).
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State
Indiana429
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Governor/
Lt. Governor
General
assembly or
state recount
commission;
see footnote 72

State Legislature
Legislature
(respective
house)

State Judge
State recount
commission
makes decision;
judicial review
of
commission’s
decision
allowed for
supreme court,
court of
appeals, and tax
court judges
(state offices)
under limited
circumstances,
with a
deferential
standard, in the
Marion County
Circuit Court;
further appeal
unclear

Congressional
Election
State recount
commission
makes decision;
no guidance for
appeal process

63
Presidential
Electors
State recount
commission
makes
decision; no
guidance for
appeal process

429. IND. CONST. art. IV, § 10 (state legislature); IND. CONST. art. V, § 6 (governor); IND.
CODE § 3-12-10-4(b) (2005) (governor, state legislature, congressional election, and
presidential electors); § 3-12-10-18 (state judges); § 3-12-11-19.5 (presidential electors); § 312-11-21 (state legislature).

64
State
Iowa430

Kansas431
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Governor/
Lt. Governor
Special
legislative
committee; no
appeal

Supreme court
appoints threejudge court;
appeal directly
to the supreme
court

State Legislature
Legislature
(respective
house)

Legislature
(respective
house); courts
serve role as
finders of fact

State Judge
Statewide:
three district
judges selected
by the supreme
court, and
judgment has
force of
supreme court
decision; no
appeal
County: one
person named
by the
contestant and
another by the
incumbent,
who together
select a third;
appeal to
district court
Statewide
election:
District Court
for Shawnee
County
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Congressional
Election
Special court
consisting of
the chief justice
of the supreme
court and four
judges of the
district court
that the
supreme court
selects; no
appeal

Presidential
Electors
Special court
consisting of
the chief justice
of the supreme
court and four
judges of the
district court
that the
supreme court
selects; no
appeal

Contests for
congressional
elections
prohibited

Supreme court
appoints threejudge court;
appeal directly
to supreme
court

Less than
statewide:
district court of
the county in
which the
person whose
election is
contested
resides; appeal
to the supreme
court for either

430. IOWA CONST. art. III, § 7 (state legislature); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 58.1–.7 (West
2012) (governor and appeals); §§ 59.1–.7 (state legislature); §§ 61.1, .12 (statewide judges
and appeals); §§ 62.1A, .20 (county judges and appeals); §§ 60.1, .6 (congressional
elections, presidential electors, and appeals).
431. KAN. CONST. art. II, § 8 (state legislature); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1443 (2000)
(governor); § 25-1451 (state legislature); § 25-1437 (state judge and presidential electors);
§ 25-1435 (congressional election).
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State
Kentucky432
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Governor/
Lt. Governor
Board of
eleven state
legislators
refers findings
to a full joint
session of the
legislature; no
appeal

State Legislature
Legislature
(respective
house)

Louisiana433

Trial court;
appeal to the
court of appeals
sitting en banc

Legislature
(respective
house)

Maine434

State supreme
court hears
contests for “all
elections”; no
appeal

Legislature
(respective
house)

State Judge
Statewide
office: Franklin
Circuit Court;
appeal to the
court of appeals
Less than
statewide
office: Circuit
court in the
county where
the contestee
resides; appeal
to the court of
appeals
Trial court
hears all
contests for
judicial offices

No judicial
elections

65

Congressional
Election
Statute
seemingly
excludes
federal
elections by
implication
(statute refers
only to “state,
county, district
or city office”)

Presidential
Electors
Statute
seemingly
excludes
federal
elections by
implication
(statute refers
only to “state,
county, district
or city office”)

Impliedly
authorized in
trial court with
appeal to court
of appeals
sitting en banc
(statute applies
to “an office”)
State supreme
court hears
contests for “all
elections”; no
appeal

Impliedly
authorized in
trial court with
appeal to court
of appeals
sitting en banc
(statute applies
to “an office”)
State supreme
court hears
contests for “all
elections”; no
appeal

432. KY. CONST. § 38 (state legislature); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 120.155 (LexisNexis
2004) (state judge, congressional election, and presidential electors); § 120.175 (appeals);
§ 120.205 (governor); § 120.215 (state legislature).
433. LA. CONST. art. III, § 7 (state legislature); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18:1401–15
(2012) (other offices).
434. ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 3 (state legislature); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, §§ 1–3,
157 (2008 and Supp. 2011) (appointed judiciary); id. tit. 21-A, § 737-A(10) (all elections
except state legislature).

66
State
Maryland435

Massachusetts436
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Governor/
Lt. Governor
Joint session of
the legislature;
no appeal

Inquest in
district court;
superior court
then has
jurisdiction;
appeal directly
to the supreme
court (statute
applies to
“elections”)

State Legislature

State Judge

Legislature
(respective
house)

Trial court or,
upon the
request of a
party or sua
sponte, a threejudge panel of
circuit court
judges assigned
by the chief
administrative
judge for the
circuit; appeal
to the court of
appeals (statute
applies to “an
election”)

Legislature
(respective
house)

No judicial
elections
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Congressional
Election
Trial court or,
upon the
request of a
party or sua
sponte, a threejudge panel of
circuit court
judges assigned
by the chief
administrative
judge for the
circuit; appeal
to the court of
appeals (statute
applies to “an
election”)

Presidential
Electors
Trial court or,
upon the
request of a
party or sua
sponte, a threejudge panel of
circuit court
judges assigned
by the chief
administrative
judge for the
circuit; appeal
to the court of
appeals (statute
applies to “an
election”)

Inquest in
district court;
superior court
then has
jurisdiction;
appeal directly
to the supreme
court (statute
applies to
“elections”)

Inquest in
district court;
superior court
then has
jurisdiction;
appeal directly
to the supreme
court (statute
applies to
“elections”)

435. MD. CONST. art. III, § 19 (state legislature); MD. CONST. art. II, § 4 (governor); MD.
CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 12-203 (LexisNexis 2010) (state judge, congressional election, and
presidential electors).
436. MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 1, § 3, art. X, (house); MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 1, § 2, art. IV
(senate); MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, art. IX (appointed judiciary); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
55, § 35 (LexisNexis 2001) (inquest); ch. 56, § 59 (superior court and supreme court
jurisdiction).
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State
Michigan437

Minnesota438
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Governor/
Lt. Governor
Quo warranto

File in Ramsey
County; chief
justice of the
supreme court
appoints threejudge court;
appeal directly
to the supreme
court

State Legislature

State Judge

Legislature
(respective
house)
Trial court makes
initial decision,
with appeal
allowed to the
Minnesota
Supreme Court;
the decision is
sent to legislature
for a legislative
hearing (in
respective house)

Quo warranto

Supreme court
and court of
appeals: chief
justice of the
supreme court
appoints threejudge court;
appeal directly
to the supreme
court
District court:
district court in
the county
where the
contestee
resides; appeal
to the court of
appeals

Mississippi439

House of
representatives
alone decides;
no appeal

Legislature
(respective
house)

Circuit court;
appeal not
specified
(statute applies
to “any office
in any county”)

67

Congressional
Election
Quo warranto

Presidential
Electors
Quo warranto

Senate: chief
justice of the
supreme court
appoints threejudge court;
appeal directly
to the supreme
court

File in Ramsey
County; chief
justice of the
supreme court
appoints threejudge court;
appeal directly
to the supreme
court

House: district
court in which
contestee
resides; appeal
to the court of
appeals

Circuit court;
appeal not
specified
(statute applies
to “any office
in any county”)

Circuit court;
appeal not
specified
(statute applies
to “any office
in any county”)

437. MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 16 (state legislature); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.4501
(West 1996) (quo warranto).
438. MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (state legislature); MINN. STAT. § 209.021 (West 2009)
(venue for statewide offices, including governor and presidential electors); § 209.045
(appointment of three-judge court for contests over statewide elections); § 209.12
(congressional elections); § 209.10 (appeals from three-judge court for statewide contests);
§ 209.09 (appeals from district court for local contests).
439. MISS. CONST. art. III, § 140 (governor); MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 38 (state legislature);
MISS. CODE. ANN. § 23-15-955 (West 2003) (state legislature); § 23-15-951 (state judge,
congressional election, and presidential electors).
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State
Missouri440

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Governor/
Lt. Governor
Supreme court;
court can
appoint
commissioner
to take
testimony

State Legislature
Legislature
(respective
house)

State Judge
Retention
elections for
circuit and
appellate
courts: supreme
court
Elections for
circuit or
associate circuit
judge: circuit
court; appeal
allowed as in
regular civil
case

[Vol. 88:1
Congressional
Election
Circuit court of
any circuit in
which any or
all of the
election was
held; appeal as
in other civil
cases (statute
applies to any
offices not
specifically
mentioned)

Presidential
Electors
Supreme court;
court can
appoint
commissioner
to take
testimony

Court can
appoint
commissioner
to take
testimony for
either

440. MO. CONST. art. III, § 18 (state legislature); MO. ANN. STAT. § 115.555 (West 2006)
(governor); § 115.563 (state legislature); §§ 115.555, .561, .575(1) (state judge);
§§115.575(2), .597 (congressional election); §§ 115.555, .561 (presidential electors).

2013]
State
Montana441

Nebraska442

Nevada443

PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN ELECTION CONTESTS
Governor/
Lt. Governor
District court of
the county in
which the
certificate,
declaration, or
acceptance of
the person’s
nomination is
filed or in
which the
incumbent
resides; appeal
not specified
(statute applies
to “any person”
for “any
nomination or
election”)
Trial court
(Lancaster
County);
appeal as in
other civil
cases

Joint session of
the legislature;
no appeal

State Legislature
Legislature
(respective
house)

Legislature
(respective
house)

Legislature
(respective
house)

State Judge
District court of
the county in
which the
certificate,
declaration, or
acceptance of
the person’s
nomination is
filed or in
which the
incumbent
resides; appeal
not specified
(statute applies
to “any person”
for “any
nomination or
election”)
Not included in
the list of
contestable
offices

Supreme court
justice: joint
session of the
legislature, with
no possibility
of appeal
Lower court
justice: trial
court
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Congressional
Election
District court of
the county in
which the
certificate,
declaration, or
acceptance of
the person’s
nomination is
filed or in
which the
incumbent
resides; appeal
not specified
(statute applies
to “any person”
for “any
nomination or
election”)
Not included in
the list of
contestable
offices

Presidential
Electors
District court of
the county in
which the
certificate,
declaration, or
acceptance of
the person’s
nomination is
filed or in
which the
incumbent
resides; appeal
not specified
(statute applies
to “any person”
for “any
nomination or
election”)
Not included in
the list of
contestable
offices

Contests for
congressional
elections
prohibited

Trial court
(venue
unspecified);
appeal unclear
(statute applies
to “any
election”
besides those
specified)

441. MONT. CONST. art. V, § 10 (state legislature); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 13-36-101 to 103 (2011) (“any . . . election”).
442. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 10 (state legislature); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1102
(LexisNexis 2008) (governor); § 32-1117 (appeals).
443. NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (state legislature); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293.407
(LexisNexis 2008) (congressional election and presidential electors); §§ 293.425, .427 (state
legislature); § 293.430 (governor and justice of the supreme court).

70
State
New
Hampshire444

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Governor/
Lt. Governor
Five-member
ballot law
commission:
New
Hampshire
Speaker of the
House and
President of the
Senate each
select two
members (one
from each
major party),
and the
governor
selects the last
person, who
must be
qualified in
election
procedure;
appeal to the
supreme court,
but issues of
fact are “final if
supported by
the requisite
evidence”

State Legislature
Five-member
ballot law
commission:
New Hampshire
Speaker of the
House and
President of the
Senate each
select two
members (one
from each major
party), and the
governor selects
the last person,
who must be
qualified in
election
procedure;
legislature
(respective
house) makes
final decision

State Judge
No judicial
elections
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Congressional
Election
Five-member
ballot law
commission:
New
Hampshire
Speaker of the
House and
President of the
Senate each
select two
members (one
from each
major party),
and the
governor
selects the last
person, who
must be
qualified in
election
procedure; no
appeal allowed

Presidential
Electors
Five-member
ballot law
commission:
New
Hampshire
Speaker of the
House and
President of the
Senate each
select two
members (one
from each
major party),
and the
governor
selects the last
person, who
must be
qualified in
election
procedure;
appeal to the
supreme court,
but issues of
fact are “final if
supported by
the requisite
evidence”

444. N.H. CONST. pt. II, arts. 22, 35 (state legislature); N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 46
(appointed judiciary); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 665:1(I) (2008) (governor, congressional
election, and presidential electors); § 665:16 (2008) (appeals); § 665:8(II) (state legislature).

2013]
State
New Jersey445

New Mexico446

New York447

PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN ELECTION CONTESTS
Governor/
Lt. Governor
Judge of the
superior court
assigned by the
chief justice of
the supreme
court; appeal to
appellate
division of
superior court
(statute applies
to elections
“voted for by
the voters of
the entire State
or more than 1
county
thereof”)
District court
where either of
the parties
resides; appeal
to supreme
court (statute
applies to “an
election”)
Quo warranto

State Legislature

State Judge

Legislature
(respective
house)

No judicial
elections

Legislature
(respective
house)

District court
where either of
the parties
resides; appeal
to supreme
court (statute
applies to “an
election”)
Quo warranto

Legislature
(respective
house)

Congressional
Election
Judge of the
superior court
assigned by the
chief justice of
the supreme
court; appeal to
appellate
division of
superior court
(statute applies
to elections
“voted for by
the voters of
the entire State
or more than 1
county
thereof”)
District court
where either of
the parties
resides; appeal
to supreme
court (statute
applies to “an
election”)
Quo warranto

71
Presidential
Electors
Judge of the
superior court
assigned by the
chief justice of
the supreme
court; appeal to
appellate
division of
superior court
(statute applies
to elections
“voted for by
the voters of
the entire State
or more than 1
county
thereof”)
District court
where either of
the parties
resides; appeal
to supreme
court (statute
applies to “an
election”)
Quo warranto
(presumably
against the
presidential
elector)

445. N.J. CONST. art. 4, § 4, ¶ 2 (state legislature); N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 6, ¶ 1 (appointed
judiciary); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:29–2 (West 1999) (governor, congressional election, and
presidential electors).
446. N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 7 (state legislature); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-14-3 (West 2003)
(“an election”); § 1-14-5 (appeals).
447. N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 9 (state legislature); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63-b (McKinney
2010) (quo warranto).
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State
North
Carolina448

North Dakota449

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Governor/
Lt. Governor
Joint session of
the legislature;
no appeal

Trial court in
county of
contestee’s
residence;
appeal directly
to the supreme
court (statute
applies to “an
election”)

[Vol. 88:1

Legislature
(respective
house)

County board
of elections;
appeal to the
state board of
elections;
further appeal
to Superior
Court of Wake
County (statute
applies to “an
election”
besides state
legislative
elections and
offices
established by
Article III of
the state
constitution)

Congressional
Election
County board
of elections;
appeal to the
state board of
elections;
further appeal
to Superior
Court of Wake
County (statute
applies to “an
election”
besides state
legislative
elections and
offices
established by
Article III of
the state
constitution)

Trial court in
county of
contestee’s
residence; appeal
directly to the
supreme court;
statute
specifically
prohibits
resolution of
contest in the
respective house

Trial court in
county of
contestee’s
residence;
appeal directly
to the supreme
court (statute
applies to “an
election”)

Trial court in
county of
contestee’s
residence;
appeal directly
to the supreme
court (statute
applies to “an
election”)

State Legislature

State Judge

Presidential
Electors
County board
of elections;
appeal to the
state board of
elections;
further appeal
to Superior
Court of Wake
County (statute
applies to “an
election”
besides state
legislative
elections and
offices
established by
Article III of
the state
constitution)
Trial court in
county of
contestee’s
residence;
appeal directly
to the supreme
court (statute
applies to “an
election”)
(presumably
the “contestee”
is the
presidential
elector)

448. N.C. CONST. art. II, § 20 (state legislature); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-182.13A
(West 2007) (governor and state legislature); §§ 163-182.10–.11, .14(b) (state judge,
congressional election, and presidential electors).
449. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-16-04 (2009) (“an election”); § 16.1-16-09 (appeals);
§ 16.1-16-10 (legislative contests determined by courts and not by either house of the
legislative assembly).

2013]
State
Ohio450

PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN ELECTION CONTESTS
Governor/
Lt. Governor
Chief justice of
supreme court
or other
supreme court
justice assigned
by chief justice
(statute applies
to “an office”
voted on by
“entire state”)

State Legislature

State Judge

Court of
Common Pleas
conducts an
inquiry and
forwards “all
testimony and all
evidence
adduced” to the
legislature
(respective
house) for
determination

Supreme court
justice: chief
justice of
supreme court
or other
supreme court
justice assigned
by chief justice

Congressional
Election
Contests for
congressional
elections
expressly
prohibited

73
Presidential
Electors
Contests for
presidential
electors
expressly
prohibited

Chief justice:
governor
selects supreme
court justice
Lower court
judges: court
of appeals
decides, with
appeal to the
supreme court

450. OHIO CONST. art. II, § 6 (state legislature); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.08(B)
(LexisNexis 2012) (statewide offices); § 3515.14 (state legislative positions); § 3515.08(B)
(supreme court, court of appeals, and chief justice); § 3515.08(C) (other judicial elections); §
3515.15 (appeal to supreme court); § 3515.08(A) (all federal positions).

74
State
Oklahoma451

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Governor/
Lt. Governor
Contest
alleging fraud
or irregularity
may be filed
with the state
election board,
and the case is
heard by the
district court
judge of the
county where
the alleged
fraud or
irregularity
occurred, or if
the fraud or
irregularity
occurred in
more than one
county, another
judge the
supreme court
designates; no
provision for
appeal (statute
applies to “an
election”)

State Legislature
Legislature
(respective
house)

State Judge
Contest
alleging fraud
or irregularity
may be filed
with the state
election board,
and the case is
heard by the
district court
judge of the
county where
the alleged
fraud or
irregularity
occurred, or if
the fraud or
irregularity
occurred in
more than one
county, another
judge the
supreme court
designates; no
provision for
appeal (statute
applies to “an
election”)
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Congressional
Election
Contest
alleging fraud
or irregularity
may be filed
with the state
election board,
and the case is
heard by the
district court
judge of the
county where
the alleged
fraud or
irregularity
occurred, or if
the fraud or
irregularity
occurred in
more than one
county, another
judge the
supreme court
designates; no
provision for
appeal (statute
applies to “an
election”)

Presidential
Electors
Contest
alleging fraud
or irregularity
may be filed
with the state
election board,
and the case is
heard by the
district court
judge of the
county where
the alleged
fraud or
irregularity
occurred, or if
the fraud or
irregularity
occurred in
more than one
county, another
judge the
supreme court
designates; no
provision for
appeal (statute
applies to “an
election”)

451. OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 6 (state legislature); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 8-109 (West
1997) (“Time for filing contest—Contests alleging irregularities or fraud”); § 8-118
(“Election contested due to fraud or other irregularity”); § 8-119 (“Petition alleging fraud—
Procedure”); § 8-120 (“Petition alleging irregularities—Procedure”); § 8-121.1 (“Hearings
on petitions alleging irregularities or fraud involving two or more counties”); § 8-122
(“Determination of successful party impossible—Procedure—Governor to call special
election”).

2013]
State
Oregon452

PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN ELECTION CONTESTS
Governor/
Lt. Governor
Circuit Court
for Marion
County; appeal
to the court of
appeals as in
other civil
cases

State Legislature

State Judge

Legislature
(respective
house); but a
statute also gives
jurisdiction to a
circuit court; see
footnote 30

Supreme court
justices and
court of appeals
judges: Circuit
Court for
Marion County
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Congressional
Election
Circuit Court
for Marion
County; appeal
to the court of
appeals as in
other civil cases

Presidential
Electors
Circuit Court
for Marion
County court;
appeal to the
court of appeals
as in other civil
cases

Senate: twojudge court of
“president
judges” of the
court of
common pleas

Special court
with the “two
nearest
president
judges”

Circuit court
judges: trial
court

Pennsylvania453

Special
legislative
committee

Trial court makes
initial
determination;
appeal to the
legislature for
final resolution

Appeal to the
court of appeals
as in other civil
cases
Supreme court
justices: twojudge court
Lower court
judges: threejudge court

House: court of
common pleas
of the county in
which the
winner resides

452. OR. CONST. art. IV § 11 (state legislature); OR. REV. STAT. § 258.036 (2011)
(governor, state judge, congressional election, and presidential electors); § 258.085
(appeals).
453. PA. CONST. art. II, § 9 (state legislature); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3312 (West
2007) (governor); §§ 3401, 3407 (state legislature); §§ 3351, 3376–77 (state judges);
§§ 3401, 3405 (congressional election); § 3351 (presidential electors).

76
State
Rhode Island454

South
Carolina455

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Governor/
Lt. Governor
State board of
elections;
review only by
discretionary
writ of
certiorari to
Rhode Island
Supreme Court
under R.I.
Supreme Court
case law
(statute applies
to “an
election”)
Board of state
canvassers;
appeal to
supreme court
on writ of
certiorari
(statute applies
to elections for
“federal
officers, state
officers,
members of the
State Senate
and the State
House of
Representatives,
and offices
involving more
than one
county”)

State Legislature

State Judge

Legislature
(respective
house)

No judicial
elections

Board of state
canvassers;
legislature
(respective
house) makes
final decision

No judicial
elections
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Congressional
Election
State board of
elections;
review only by
discretionary
writ of
certiorari to
Rhode Island
Supreme Court
under R.I.
Supreme Court
case law
(statute applies
to “an
election”)
Board of state
canvassers;
appeal to
supreme court
on writ of
certiorari
(statute applies
to elections for
“federal
officers, state
officers,
members of the
State Senate
and the State
House of
Representatives,
and offices
involving more
than one
county”)

Presidential
Electors
State board of
elections;
review only by
discretionary
writ of
certiorari to
Rhode Island
Supreme Court
under R.I.
Supreme Court
case law
(statute applies
to “an
election”)
Board of state
canvassers;
appeal to
supreme court
on writ of
certiorari
(statute applies
to elections for
“federal
officers, state
officers,
members of the
State Senate
and the State
House of
Representatives,
and offices
involving more
than one
county”)

454. R.I. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (state legislature); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-7-5(a)(11) (2003)
(state board of elections); Van Daam v. DiPrete, 560 A.2d 953, 954 (R.I. 1989) (holding that
the decision of the board of elections is “final and subject to review only by a petition for
certiorari filed in this court”).
455. S.C. CONST. art. III, § 11 (state legislature); S.C. CONST. art. V §§ 3, 8, 13 (judiciary
appointed by general assembly); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-17-260 (Supp. 2011) (governor, state
legislature, congressional election, and presidential electors); § 7-17-270 (appeals).

2013]
State
South Dakota456

PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN ELECTION CONTESTS
Governor/
Lt. Governor
Supreme court
(statute applies
to “state offices
or judicial
officers in the
Supreme
Court”)

State Legislature
Legislature
(respective
house)

State Judge
Supreme court
justices:
supreme court
(statute applies
to “state offices
or judicial
officers in the
Supreme
Court”)
Lower court
judges: circuit
court of a
county which
includes the
locality where
the election or
some part
thereof was
conducted;
appeal as in
other civil cases

Tennessee457

Joint session of
the legislature;
twelve member
“Committee on
the Governor’s
Election”
comprised of 7
house members
and 5 senate
members takes
evidence and
hears
objections; no
appeal

Legislature
(respective
house)

Supreme court
justice: not
specified
Chancellor
elections:
chancellor
assigned by the
chief justice of
the supreme
court
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Congressional
Election
Circuit court of
a county which
includes the
locality where
the election or
some part
thereof was
conducted;
appeal as in
other civil cases
(statute applies
to “all other
contests” that
do not go
straight to
supreme court)

Presidential
Electors
Circuit court of
a county which
includes the
locality where
the election or
some part
thereof was
conducted;
appeal as in
other civil
cases (statute
applies to “all
other contests”
that do not go
straight to
supreme court)

Chancery court
where the
contestee
resides; no
provision for
appeal (statute
applies to
“election
contests” other
than those
expressly
provided for in
the statute)

Presidential
electors
tribunal
composed of
the governor,
secretary of
state, and the
attorney
general; no
appeal

456. S.D. CONST. art. III, § 9 (state legislature); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-22-7 (2004)
(governor and supreme court justices); § 12-22-7(2) (state judges, congressional election,
and presidential electors); § 12-22-25 (right to appeal contests involving state judges,
congressional election, and presidential electors).
457. TENN. CONST. art. II, § 11 (state legislature); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 2-18-101, -106,
-109, -116 (2003) (governor and appeals); § 2-17-102 (state legislature); § 2-17-101

78
State
Texas458

Utah459

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Governor/
Lt. Governor
Joint session of
the legislature;
no appeal

District court of
the county in
which the
complaining
voter resides;
appeal as in
other civil
cases (statute
applies to
“election or
nomination of
any person to
any public
office”)

State Legislature
Legislature
(respective
house)

Legislature
(respective
house)
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Statewide
office: Travis
County District
Court

Congressional
Election
Contests for
congressional
elections
prohibited

Presidential
Electors
Governor has
exclusive
jurisdiction

Less than
statewide:
Either the
county where
the contestee
resides if it is
within the
territory
covered by the
election, or any
county wholly
or partly
covered if no
contestee
resides in the
county; appeal
as in other civil
cases
District court of
the county in
which the
complaining
voter resides;
appeal as in
other civil cases
(statute applies
to “election or
nomination of
any person to
any public
office”)

District court of
the county in
which the
complaining
voter resides;
appeal as in
other civil cases
(statute applies
to “election or
nomination of
any person to
any public
office”)

District court of
the county in
which the
complaining
voter resides;
appeal as in
other civil
cases (statute
applies to
“election or
nomination of
any person to
any public
office”)

State Judge

(chancellors and congressional elections); § 2-17-103 (presidential electors).
458. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 8 (state legislature); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 221.001 (West
2010) (congressional election); § 221.002(b) (governor); § 221.002(c)–(d) (state legislature);
§ 221.002(e) (presidential electors); § 221.002(f) (appeals); § 231.004 (disqualification of
district court judge); § 232.006 (venue).
459. UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 10 (state legislature); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 20A-4-402 to
-403 (LexisNexis 2010) (governor, state judge, congressional election, and presidential
electors); § 20A-4-406 (appeals).

2013]
State
Vermont460

Virginia461

PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN ELECTION CONTESTS
Governor/
Lt. Governor
Superior Court
for Washington
County; appeal
to court of
appeals as in
other civil
cases (statute
applies to “any
office, other
than for the
general
assembly”)

Joint session of
the legislature;
no appeal

State Legislature

State Judge

Legislature
(respective
house)

No judicial
elections

Legislature
(respective
house)

No judicial
elections
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Congressional
Election
Superior Court
for Washington
County; appeal
to court of
appeals as in
other civil cases
(statute applies
to “any office,
other than for
the general
assembly”)

Presidential
Electors
Superior Court
for Washington
County; appeal
to court of
appeals as in
other civil
cases (statute
applies to “any
office, other
than for the
general
assembly”)

No specific
guidance

Circuit Court in
Richmond by a
special court
composed of
the chief judge
of the circuit
court and two
circuit judges
from different
circuits “not
contiguous to
the City of
Richmond”
who the chief
justice of the
Virginia
Supreme Court
appoints

U.S. Senate
primaries:
decided in the
Circuit Court in
Richmond by a
special court
composed of
the chief judge
of the circuit
court and two
circuit judges
from different
circuits “not
contiguous to
the City of
Richmond”
who the chief
justice of the
Virginia
Supreme Court
appoints

460. VT. CONST. ch. II, §§ 14, 19 (state legislature); VT. CONST. ch. II, § 32 (providing
that the governor shall fill judicial vacancies); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2603 (2002 & Supp.
2012) (“any office, other than for the general assembly”); §§ 2605–2606 (state legislature).
461. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 7 (state legislature); VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7 (judiciary
appointed by General Assembly); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-804 (2011) (governor); §§ 24.2-805

80
State
Washington462

West
Virginia463

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Governor/
Lt. Governor
Any justice of
the supreme
court, judge of
the court of
appeals, or
judge of the
superior court
has
jurisdiction;
possible appeal
to the supreme
court from a
decision of the
superior court;
appeal from
court of appeals
if action
initiated there
unclear (statute
applies to “any
candidate,”
“any election
officer,” or “the
election”)
Joint session of
the legislature;
no appeal

State Legislature

State Judge

Legislature
(respective
house)

Any justice of
the supreme
court, judge of
the court of
appeals, or
judge of the
superior court
has jurisdiction;
possible appeal
to the supreme
court from a
decision of the
superior court;
appeal from
court of appeals
if action
initiated there
unclear (statute
applies to “any
candidate,”
“any election
officer,” or “the
election”)

Legislature
(respective
house)

Special court
consisting of
one person the
contestee
selects, a
second person
the contestant
chooses, and a
third the
governor
appoints;
appeal to the
supreme court
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Congressional
Election
Any justice of
the supreme
court, judge of
the court of
appeals, or
judge of the
superior court
has jurisdiction;
possible appeal
to the supreme
court from a
decision of the
superior court;
appeal from
court of appeals
if action
initiated there
unclear (statute
applies to “any
candidate,”
“any election
officer,” or “the
election”)
Not included in
the list of
contestable
offices

Presidential
Electors
Any justice of
the supreme
court, judge of
the court of
appeals, or
judge of the
superior court
has
jurisdiction;
possible appeal
to the supreme
court from a
decision of the
superior court;
appeal from
court of appeals
if action
initiated there
unclear (statute
applies to “any
candidate,”
“any election
officer,” or “the
election”)
Not included in
the list of
contestable
offices

to -806 (congressional election and presidential electors).
462. WASH. CONST. art. III, § 4 (executive offices); WASH. CONST. art. II, § 8 (state
legislature); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.68.011 (West 2005); § 29A.68.120 (describing
the appeal period from the superior court); In re Coday, 130 P.3d 809, 817 (Wash. 2006)
(finding that, even though Washington’s Constitution confers power over election contests
involving governor and other executive officers to the state legislature, § 29A.68 confers
jurisdiction to the courts).
463. W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 24 (state legislature); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-7-2
(LexisNexis 2011) (governor); § 3-7-4 (state legislature); § 3-7-3 (state judge); §§ 3-7-1 to -9

2013]
State
Wisconsin464

Wyoming465

PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN ELECTION CONTESTS
Governor/
Lt. Governor
Trial court; if
election is in
only one
appellate
district, appeal
is to the court
of appeals; if
election spans
more than one
appellate
district, appeal
is to the 4th
District Court
of Appeals;
further review
to supreme
court unclear
(statute applies
to “any
election”)
Trial court; no
guidance for
appeal process
(statute applies
to “an office”
besides those
specifically
mentioned)

State Legislature
Legislature
(respective
house)

Legislature
(respective
house)

State Judge
Trial court; if
election is in
only one
appellate
district, appeal
is to the court
of appeals; if
election spans
more than one
appellate
district, appeal
is to the 4th
District Court
of Appeals;
further review
to supreme
court unclear
(statute applies
to “any
election”)
Trial court; no
guidance for
appeal process
(statute applies
to “an office”
besides those
specifically
mentioned)

Congressional
Election
Trial court; if
election is in
only one
appellate
district, appeal
is to the court
of appeals; if
election spans
more than one
appellate
district, appeal
is to the 4th
District Court
of Appeals;
further review
to supreme
court unclear
(statute applies
to “any
election”)
Trial court; no
guidance for
appeal process
(statute applies
to “an office”
besides those
specifically
mentioned)

81
Presidential
Electors
Trial court; if
election is in
only one
appellate
district, appeal
is to the court
of appeals; if
election spans
more than one
appellate
district, appeal
is to the 4th
District Court
of Appeals;
further review
to supreme
court unclear
(statute applies
to “any
election”)
Legislature; no
appeal

(congressional election and election of presidential electors not included in the list of
contestable elections).
464. WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 7 (state legislature); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9.01 (West 2004 &
Supp. 2012) (“any election”); § 13.23 (state legislature).
465. WYO. CONST. art. III, § 10 (state legislature); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-17-102 (2011)
(governor, state judge, and congressional election); § 22-17-114 (presidential electors).

